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ABSTRACT
This study examines whether reference levels change over time and the impact on
individuals‟ risk-taking behavior. I apply expectations-based reference-dependent
preferences theory to analyze whether individuals‟ reference levels change over time in
an economic setting. The theory suggests that individuals develop reference levels based
on expectations of future outcomes (Koszegi and Rabin 2006). Therefore, this study
examines whether individuals‟ expectations affect the setting of their reference level and
how possible changes in reference levels affect subsequent risk-taking behavior. This
study also provides evidence on how budget-based contracts impact individual risk taking
behavior in a single period setting. Prior research has used multiple theories in an
attempt to explain contradictory results relating to budget target difficulty and risk-taking
behaviors. This study provides more evidence to the literature by further examining the
impact of budget-based contracts on individuals‟ risk-taking behavior. A 1 x 2 between
subjects experiment was conducted over five periods. Budget target was the manipulated
factor at two levels: easy and moderate. Results suggest that individuals under easy
budget targets make riskier decisions. Additionally, individuals‟ reference levels change
over time and the change in reference level is greater for those individuals who
continually attain their budget target, suggesting that expectations do increase the
reference level. Lastly, in the current study, changes in reference level do not have a
significant impact on risky decision making.

v

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Questions and Motivation
Budgeting is an important activity in management accounting and an essential
business process for most organizations. Budgets are used by virtually all organizations
for a variety of reasons. They can be used to plan and coordinate activities and they can
also be used to motivate, evaluate, and reward performance (Baiman and Demski 1980;
Baiman 1990; Luft and Shields 2003). In designing an incentive compensation system,
many organizations choose to incorporate budget-based measures into their contracts in
order to influence behavior and align owner and employee interests (Bonner, Hastie,
Sprinkle, and Young 2000; Murphy 2001). Budgets influence behavior by directing
employee attention towards desirable actions and by creating performance standards
against which actual performance is judged (Bonner et al. 2000; Sprinkle 2003).
The majority of research examining the impact of budget-based contracts
on employee behaviors examines effort-intensive tasks (Bonner et al. 2000). Few studies
examine the impact of budget-based contracts on employee risk-taking behavior (Chow,
Kohlmeyer, and Wu 2007; Sprinkle, Williamson, and Upton 2008) and even fewer
examine the effectiveness of budget-based contracts over time. Organizations that use
incentive contracts expect that these contracts will be effective over multiple periods.
This study investigates whether incentive contracts, specifically budget-based contracts,
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maintain their desired effectiveness over time. Specifically, the effectiveness of a
budget-based contract could be dependent on individuals‟ reference levels, which may
not remain constant over time, but rather could vary based on prior economic outcomes,
or the attainment (or failure to attain) the budget target. Therefore, this study will
examine how changes in individuals‟ reference levels over time, as a function of meeting
or failing to meet the budget target, impacts individuals‟ decision making over time.
Most prior studies analyzing the effects of incentive system design on goal
congruence examine single period settings (e.g., Chow et al. 2007; Sprinkle et al. 2008).
An open question is whether incentive system designs maintain their desired effect over
multiple periods. It is possible that over time the effectiveness of an incentive system
could deteriorate or be enhanced due to changes in individuals‟ reference levels, to the
extent that the reference level could change based on having met (or not met) budget
targets (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Lopes 1987; Koszegi and Rabin 2006).
Additionally, decision making theory suggests that reference levels play a vital role in
individuals‟ decisions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Lopes 1987). Therefore, it is
important to analyze whether reference levels change, and if they do, what is the impact
on incentive contracts effectiveness.
To analyze the aforementioned research question, I apply expectationsbased reference-dependent preferences theory (Koszegi and Rabin 2006). This theory
proposes how individuals‟ reference levels are developed. Expectations-based referencedependent preferences theory suggests that expectations, derived from an individuals‟
environment, play a critical role in the development of reference levels. Specifically,
individuals‟ develop expectations of what is going to occur in a subsequent time period,
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and these expectations, along with exogenous factors, play a role in the formulation of
individuals‟ reference levels. Therefore, this study will examine whether expectations of
future economic outcomes impact individuals‟ reference levels.
In addition to analyzing the multi-period effectiveness of budget-based contracts,
this study also provides empirical evidence on the applicability of securitypotential/aspiration level theory (SP|A). The effect of budget-based contracts on the level
of risk an employee is willing to take, has not always provided conclusive results (e.g.,
Chow et al. 2007; Sprinkle et al. 2008).1 Most research analyzing risky decision making
applies prospect theory to describe individual behavior.2 Additional theories, such as
SP|A, may be more applicable in certain situations. SP|A was developed to describe how
individuals approach and make risky decisions and to recognize the importance of
attaining one‟s aspiration level.3 In budget-based contracts, the budget goals can be
thought of as reference levels and SP|A stresses the importance of the reference level and
how its achievement, whether guaranteed or not, affects individuals‟ behaviors.
Therefore, in an economic setting which incorporates budget-based contracts, it is
possible that SP|A has more explanatory validity than prospect theory in describing

1

Chow et al. (2007) found that high budget targets lead to higher risk-taking behavior while Sprinkle et al.
(2008) found that low budget targets lead to higher risk-taking behavior. An implicit assumption in this
study is that most firms want their employees to take certain amounts of risk and the design of incentive
compensation systems can help firms accomplish this objective.
2
Prospect theory suggests that individuals use their reference level to code alternatives (outcomes) as gains
or losses. Once these alternatives are framed as gains or losses, prospect theory suggests the individuals in
a loss frame will be risk-seeking and individuals in a gain frame will be risk-averse (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979).
3
Prospect theory describes a reference level as the reference point. A reference point is the kink in the
prospect theory value function at which an individual perceives an outcome as a gain or a loss (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979). An aspiration level, as described by security-potential/aspiration level theory, is an
outcome that receives special attention in the decision making process (Lopes 1987). The term reference
level, in this study, is a general term that encompasses both reference points and aspiration levels.
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individuals‟ behaviors. This study provides additional empirical evidence relating to the
applicability of SP|A to individual decision making under budget-based contracts.
The effect of incentive schemes, and particularly budget-based contracts, on
managers‟ risk-taking behavior is an area that has received little attention in the literature
(Sprinkle 2003; Sprinkle et al. 2008; Drake and Kohlmeyer 2010). One of the
fundamental issues firms face when using budget-based contracts is determining the
attainability of the budget target. Goal setting theory suggests that firms should set
difficult but attainable goals which have been shown to increase individuals‟ effort and
thus increase output. There is ample empirical evidence to support this claim (e.g.,
Mento, Steel, and Karen 1987; Locke and Latham 1990; 2002; Jeffrey, Onay, and Larrick
2010). The results relating to difficult but attainable goals, however, are generally related
to effort-intensive tasks and tasks with a direct link between effort and output. The
question of how budget target difficulty affects risk-taking behavior in tasks that have a
more tenuous link between effort and output is a less studied area and is the setting of this
study. Therefore, this study will also assess how budget-based targets affect individuals‟
risk-taking behavior in a setting where the link between effort and output is tenuous.
1.2. Research Design
To address the aforementioned research questions a 1 x 2 between-subjects
experiment was conducted. The between-subjects factor, budget target level, was
manipulated at two levels, easy and moderate.4 In designing budget-based incentive
systems, one of the most important aspects is the difficulty of the selected budget target.
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A difficult budget target level is not included because prospect theory and security-potential/aspiration
level theory have the same predictions relating to difficult budget targets. Specifically, for difficult targets
individuals must be risk-seeking in order to attain the budget target.
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Prior research suggests that most firms use moderate budget targets, rather than difficult
budget targets, to encourage employees to attain the budget goals (Merchant and
Manzoni 1989) and subsequent research suggests firms should use moderate budget
targets (Fisher, Peffer, and Spinkle 2003). Therefore, this study incorporates budget
difficulty as a variable to assess its effects on risk-taking behavior and how budget target
difficulty may affect individuals‟ reference levels and subsequent behavior. The
experiment incorporates five periods in order to assess how individuals‟ reference levels
change over time and the concomitant effects on risk-taking behavior. The experimental
task involves participants selecting from a range of alternatives that vary in level of risk.
Experimental participants are undergraduate students who received performance-based
compensation for their participation in the experimental task.
There are a number of dependent variables in the experiment. The first is the
variance of the project that is selected.5 Every participant will be presented with seven
alternatives from which one must be selected. The alternatives were developed to
simulate the risk-return continuum, where lower risk alternatives have smaller variances
and higher risk alternatives have higher variances. The variances are defined by
incorporating two factors. The first factor is the probability of attaining the budget target.
This factor dictates the likelihood of not attaining (receiving base salary) or attaining the
budget target (base salary plus variable bonus) and is a simulation of downside risk,
which provides information relating to the worst case scenario, the receipt of only base
annual pay (Shapira 1994). The probability of attaining the budget target directly impacts
the other component of variance, the difference between the highest and lowest
5

In the experiment “projects” as used in the discussion of the experiment were referred to as products. The
term project is used for expositional purposes.
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compensation amounts if a specific budget target is met. For low risk alternatives the
lowest and highest amounts are fairly close together, and the difference between the
highest and lowest amounts increases as more risk is incorporated into alternatives.
Therefore, when an individual decides to take more risk they are increasing the variance
of the payments they could possibly receive.
The other dependent variable is the change in reference level. A participant‟s
reference level is assessed by their answer to the following question, “At what level of
payment would you have neither positive nor negative emotion?” (Arkes, Hirshleifer,
Jiang, and Lim 2010). This variable is measured as the difference between a baseline
reference level and the reference level at the end of the experiment.
1.3 Results and Contribution
The results of the study provide evidence that individuals under easy budget
targets make more risky decisions than individuals under moderate budget targets. This
suggests that firms wanting their employees to make risky decisions should utilize easy
budget targets. The results also suggest that individuals‟ reference levels change over
time and the magnitude of the change in reference level is dependent upon the number of
times the budget target was attained. Specifically, there is a positive relationship between
the number of times the budget target was attained and change in reference level. This
suggests that individuals who continually attain the budget target have greater
expectations of future economic outcomes than those who miss the budget target at least
once. Lastly, this study does not provide evidence that changes in reference level impact
subsequent decision making. Most theories relating to risky decision making, such as
security-potential/aspiration level theory and prospect theory, propose that reference
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levels play a vital role in decisions that are made. This study does not find evidence to
support this prediction.6
This study makes several contributions to the academic literature. I provide
further evidence of the applicability of a decision making theory, securitypotential/aspiration level theory, in an accounting context. This analysis contributes to
decision making literature and compensation literature. I also apply expectations-based
reference-dependent preferences theory in an accounting context and provide evidence
that expectations of future economic outcomes impact the formulation of individuals‟
reference levels. This finding contributes to decision making literature and reference
level literature.
I also provide empirical evidence that reference levels change over time. Prior
decision making theories suggest that reference levels change over time but there is a
paucity of empirical evidence documenting this change. Additionally, this study
contributes to reference level literature by demonstrating that continual attainment of a
budget target increases individuals‟ reference levels.
This study also makes a number of contributions to practice as well. Prior
research examining the effect of budget target difficulty has not provided a definitive
conclusion of the behavioral impact of budget target level on employee risk-taking
behavior. This study provides additional empirical evidence that easy budget targets lead
to more risk-taking behavior than moderate budget targets, which are the preferred
budget target difficulty level in practice (Merchant and Manzoni 1989). Therefore, firms

6

Possible explanations why this result was not found are presented in the conclusions section of the study.
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wanting their employees to make more risky decisions should implement easy budget
targets rather than moderate budget targets.
Lastly, the results suggest that individuals‟ reference levels change over time.
Organizations should be aware of employees‟ changes in reference level because changes
in reference level can impact the effectiveness of incentive contracts. Therefore,
organizations should be very diligent in analyzing the behaviors that incentive contracts
elicit and be aware that changes in employees‟ reference levels could be a main factor if
employee behaviors are not in line with management‟s goals.
The remainder of the proposal is presented in sections. The next section presents
the literature review and hypothesis development. The third section presents the method
and experimental procedures. The fourth section presents the results of the experiment
and supplemental analysis. The last section contains the conclusions.

8

2.0 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Budgets
Budgets permeate many aspects of an organization. They affect how decision
rights are allocated and are also used to motivate, evaluate, and reward performance
(Baiman and Demski 1980; Baiman 1990; Luft and Shields 2003; Sprinkle et al. 2008).
Budgets can also be incorporated into budget-based performance contracts, in which
budgeted performance targets are embedded in compensation contracts. From a directing
and informational perspective, budget-based contracts are very effective at focusing
employees‟ attention to the specific goals embedded within the contract (Fisher et al.
2008). Budget-based contracts can also be used to create goal congruence (Milgrom and
Roberts 1992; Sprinkle 2003). Specifically, the use of budget-based contracts can align
the goals of the firm with the goals of employees by incentivizing activities that benefit
the firm (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). In some cases, budget-based contracts can be used
to incentivize employees to take a certain action, such as selecting between risky
alternatives.
An empirical question for which there is mixed evidence in the literature relates to
how budget targets affect risky decision making and whether individuals‟ reference levels
for evaluating and selecting risky projects change over time or remain constant. The
following sections describe the academic literature related to how budget targets should
be set in order to create goal congruence between the firm and its employees, describes
9

theories related to risky decision making, and provides a description of how reference
levels may be determined and may change over time.
2.2 Budget-Targets and Goal Setting
2.2.1 Goal Setting
Goal setting theory and goal setting literature suggest that firms should set
difficult but attainable performance targets. This literature is replete with empirical
evidence that performance increases with target difficulty and that goals improve
performance (e.g., Mento et al. 1987; Locke and Latham 1990, 2002; Jeffrey et al. 2010).
According to goal theory, more difficult goals improve performance by motivating
greater effort and persistence at a task (Locke and Latham 1990). The empirical evidence
supporting the positive association between goal difficulty and performance generally
relates to effort intensive tasks. In these types of tasks, the positive relationship between
goal difficulty and performance persists until the goal becomes too difficult and
individuals do not have the ability to reach it and “give up” (Locke and Latham 1990,
2002; Sprinkle et al. 2008). In general, there is consensus that goal difficulty increases
performance relating to effort intensive tasks because the link between effort and outcome
is clear.
An area that has received less attention is how goals affect decisions under risk
(Valence 2001; Jeffrey et al. 2010). Many managerial tasks are not necessarily effort
intensive, but rather are based on achieving some goal of expected profit or return on
investment, compared to achieving an effort intensive production goal (Ruchala 1999).
Most existing research examining risk taking and goal attainment suggests that pursuing a
goal increases risk taking (e.g., Mao 1970, Payne, Laughhunn, and Crum 1980, 1981;
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Larrick, Heath, and Wu 2009). For example, field studies suggest that managers are
more willing to take on risks in order to reach a goal (Mao 1970; March and Shapira
1987, 1992) either because the goal has a specific financial reward related to the
achievement of the goal or because goals create internal motivation to achieve the goal.
Research also suggests that individuals are more willing to take on risks to reach
hypothetical job-related goals (Payne et al. 1981), to reach a real monetary goal (Larrick
et al. 2009), and are more willing to cheat in order to reach a goal (Schweitzer, Ordonez,
and Douma 2004). Although this evidence suggests that difficult performance targets
increase individuals‟ willingness to take on risks in order to achieve the goal, there is also
evidence that this is not always the case (e.g., Bavelas and Lee 1978; Rothkopf and
Billington 1979; Polzer and Neale 1995; Sprinkle et al. 2008; Ordonez, Schweitzer,
Galinsky, and Bazerman 2009).
Although most do not question the effectiveness of goals, some researchers have
been concerned with isolating boundary conditions and unintended consequences of goal
setting (Ordonez et al. 2009). For example, Ordonez et al. (2009) suggest that stretch
goals can have serious side effects, such as shifting risk attitudes, promoting unethical
behavior, and triggering the psychological costs of goal failure. In addition, prior
research has demonstrated that difficult goals can harm performance on complex tasks
and can detract from performance on tasks or task dimensions for which goals are not set
(Bavelas and Lee 1978; Rothkopf and Billington 1979; Polzer and Neale 1995).
Therefore, there is evidence suggesting that difficult performance targets are not always
optimal in all settings.
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There is some research that questions the validity of the assumption that difficult
goals increase risk taking. Merchant and Manzoni (1989) surveyed fifty-four profit
centers and found that budget targets in the field are not generally set to be difficult.
They report that budget targets were set to be achievable for most years included in the
study in order to reduce the risk of managers giving up on the goal and to also make
managers who achieved the goal feel like “winners” (Merchant and Manzoni 1989).
There is also empirical evidence that “moderately” difficult goals or targets enhance
overall firm performance while “over-ambitious” or difficult targets induce inferior
incentives on productivity (Van der Stede 2000; Fisher, Peffer, and Sprinkle 2003).
Additionally, Hirst (1987) suggests that task uncertainty may moderate the association
between goal difficulty and performance.
Other research has demonstrated potential downside effects of difficult
performance targets or settings where difficult performance targets are not optimal.
Schweitzer et al. (2004) found that participants were more likely to cheat in an
experimental setting in order to reach a goal when they had a high performance target. In
an analytical investigation, Kuang and Suijs (2009) suggest that managers compensated
with a cash bonus plan should have performance targets that are below the level that
would maximize their effort because this decreases the compensation risk placed on the
employee while not having a significant impact on the amount of effort exerted. In other
words, the authors suggest that modest or easy performance targets are optimal in this
setting. The conclusions of Kuang and Suijs (2009) are consistent with the argument for
setting performance targets that are easily achievable (Merchant and Manzoni 1989; Hirst
and Lowry 1990; Fisher et al. 2003).
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Based on extant research, therefore, it is uncertain whether more difficult
performance targets lead to more risk taking or less risk taking and in what situations
more difficult performance targets may lead to poor results. The empirical evidence
appears to provide mixed results, and therefore the impact of goals on risk taking
warrants further investigation.
2.2.2 Budget Targets
Budgets are used in virtually all organizations (Murphy 2001; Fisher et al. 2008).
In addition to budgets, budget-based contracts are also used extensively in practice and
come in a variety of forms (Murphy 2001; Sprinkle and Williamson 2004; Chow et al.
2007; Fisher et al. 2008). Bonner et al. (2000) conclude from their review of eighty-five
studies in various fields that budget-based incentive schemes are the most likely to
produce positive effects, such as increased productivity and effort, which foster goal
congruence.7
There are a number of studies that are of particular importance to this study.
Ruchala (1999) examined whether budget goal attainment and different types of incentive
compensation affected individuals‟ selection and continuance of risky investment
projects.8 Ruchala (1999) designed her experiment to mimic an investment portfolio
choice. After the first project selection, participants were informed whether or not they
were ahead or behind their budget goal and were also told that their selections in the
subsequent periods would affect whether or not they would achieve their budget goal.
Therefore, the experiment is essentially a single period analysis containing multiple
7

Bonner et al. (2000) use the term quota scheme, but the criteria (Bonner et al. 2000, 26) corresponds to
budget-based contracts which use a form of quota (budget-target).
8
The budget goal in Ruchala (1999) was 20%. Participants were informed after the initial selection
whether their return was 18% or 22% and that their subsequent decisions could affect final goal attainment.
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selections of risky projects because the final goal attainment (failure to attain) occurred
only once. The results suggest that individuals who were told they were behind their
budget goal after their first decision in the experiment made riskier investment decisions
in subsequent periods than participants who were told they were ahead of their budget
goal. The results tend to support prospect theory predictions that individuals in a loss
frame (told they are behind the budget goal) will exhibit more risk-seeking behavior
while individuals in a gain frame (told they are ahead of the budget goal) will exhibit
more risk-averse behavior.
The analysis of the change in risky decision making, however, was not based on
the same task, but rather was based on participant‟s responses to an investment ranking
task (Ruchala 1999). Therefore, Ruchala (1999) did not investigate what drove this
change, i.e., whether it was a change in risk attitude or a change in individuals‟ reference
levels. In relation to incentive contract type, Ruchala (1999) demonstrates that a bonusbased contract, in which monetary rewards are not paid unless the budget goal is attained,
lead to significantly riskier decisions when combined with not achieving the budget
goal.9 The main implication from Ruchala (1999) is that budget goal attainment has a
significant effect on participants‟ subsequent risky investment decisions; failure to
achieve the budget target promotes risk-seeking behavior.
Drake and Kohlmeyer (2010) reexamine how prior outcomes and incentive
schemes influence how individuals frame current decisions and influence individuals‟
risk behavior. They examine how individuals react when they are told they are behind or
9

Ruchala (1999) compared bonus-based contracts to profit sharing contracts. Under profit sharing
contracts, participants receive a monetary share of the profit regardless of budget goal attainment. There
was no hypothesis for a main effect of incentive compensation and when a main effect variable for
compensation was included in the model the results were insignificant.
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ahead of some reference level. Drake and Kohlmeyer (2010) do not, however, examine
how individuals‟ reference levels change over time, which is the focus of the current
study. In an experiment analyzing risky investment decisions, they find support for
Ruchala‟s (1999) results by demonstrating that individuals who are given a negative
performance report, which is equivalent to failing to reach a budget target, are motivated
to engage in more risk-seeking behavior than individuals who are given a positive
performance report. Taken together, Ruchala (1999) and Drake and Kohlmeyer (2010)
illustrate that prior outcomes can influence subsequent risk-taking behavior under budgetbased contracts.
Recent research in accounting has examined how the level of budget-targets
affects propensity to take risks. In two closely related articles, Chow et al. (2007) and
Sprinkle et al. (2008) examined this issue. Chow et al. (2007) investigated a single
period product selection setting, in which individuals were told to select one out of seven
products to manufacture and sell. Each product had a unique distribution relating to the
return the product would generate. Participants were also presented with either an easy
performance target (budget-target) of 5 percent or a difficult performance target of 25
percent. The budget targets were based on the product return. For example, the easy
budget target was set to a 5 percent return on the product selected. Participants then
made their selection of which product to produce and sell. The results from the
experiment support prospect theory‟s prediction that difficult budget targets lead to more
risk taking by individuals. This finding suggests that firms wanting their employees to
take more risks should implement difficult budget targets in order to create goal
congruence.
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Sprinkle et al. (2008) examined how the level of a budget target affects
individuals‟ propensity to take risks in a single period setting. Sprinkle et al. (2008) also
incorporated an effort element in their experiment to investigate the trade-off between
effort and risk taking. In their experiment, individuals were presented with a matrix
containing twelve projects. Participants were presented with four pieces of information:
(1) probability of meeting the budget, (2) amount paid if the budget is not met, (3) lowest
amount paid if the budget is met, and (4) the highest amount paid if the budget is met.
Unlike Chow et al. (2007), the experimental design incorporated a costly effort
component. The results pertaining to risky decisions from Sprinkle et al. (2008) suggest
that individuals‟ propensity to take risks increases when they are compensated based on
easier budget targets compared to more difficult budget targets. These results are
contradictory to Chow et al. (2007) and suggest that easy budget targets, rather than more
difficult budget targets, would be beneficial for firms wanting their employees to take
greater risks in their decision making. The authors apply security-potential/aspiration
theory rather than prospect theory to explain their results.10
It is interesting that the two studies addressing virtually the same research
question generated results that suggest two opposing prescriptions for creating goal
congruency through the use of budget targets and apply two distinct decision theories to
explain the results. Chow et al. (2007) suggest that difficult budget targets lead to a
higher propensity for risk taking while Sprinkle et al. (2008) suggest that easy budget
targets lead to a higher propensity for risk taking. There are a number of possibilities for
why the results were so different. First, Chow et al. (2007) used actual budget targets,
10

A detailed discussion of Sprinkle et al. (2008) and the application of security-potential/aspiration theory
is presented in a subsequent section.
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which were communicated to the experimental participants, whereas Sprinkle et al.
(2008) did not explicitly state what the budget targets were, but rather incorporated the
budget targets into the information presented to participants in the decision matrix. The
decision matrix used in Sprinkle et al. (2008) presented participants with four pieces of
information relating to each of the twelve projects from which the participants selected:
probability of meeting the budget, amount paid if the budget is not met, lowest amount
paid if the budget is met, and highest amount paid if the budget is met. Therefore,
Sprinkle et al. (2008) did not explicitly state the parameters of the budget targets but
rather incorporated the easy and more difficult budget targets into these four pieces of
information.
Second, the difficulty of the budget targets could be different between the two
studies. In Chow et al. (2007), the budget targets were based on an expected level of
return and were set at 5 percent (easy) and 25 percent (difficult). In this case, the 25
percent budget target may have been perceived as extremely difficult to achieve, thus
forcing participants to engage in risk-taking behavior in order to possibly achieve the
budget target. Sprinkle et al. (2008) did not explicitly mention what the budget targets
were but did mention that “difficult” targets would not produce the same study results as
they found. In other words, it can be presumed that Sprinkle et al. (2008) designed their
experiment to incorporate “moderately” difficult budget targets.
Another possible reason for the difference in results is that Sprinkle et al. (2008)
incorporated a costly effort component in order to analyze the trade-off between risk and
effort. There were no costs of effort in Chow et al. (2007). Generally employees who
make investment/project decisions do not exert the physical effort to impact the outcome.

17

They generally serve in a management capacity, delegating responsibility and making
decisions on courses of action (Ruchala 1999). Therefore, their main focus is on the
decision, weighting the cost/benefit of the alternatives. They would not consider the cost
of effort exerted by others to implement or execute the decision. It is possible that the
incorporation of the cost of effort lead to different empirical results.
The products presented in Chow et al. (2007) followed much of prior research by
holding the expected value of all possible alternatives constant. By holding expected
value constant, the outcome variance of the projects is manipulated, thus simulating
different levels of risk. This method is beneficial to isolate how risk affects individual‟s
decision making. Sprinkle et al. (2008) presented alternatives that had different expected
values, different variances, and different levels of downside risk. Sprinkle et al. (2008)
incorporated these factors into their experimental design. This study will follow Chow et
al. (2007) and most extant research and hold expected value of the alternatives constant
while incorporating many of the design aspects of Sprinkle et al. (2010).
Lastly, none of the project selections available for selection in Chow et al. (2007)
guaranteed the achievement of the budget target. As will be discussed in detail later,
security-potential/aspiration theory is dependent upon the achievement of an individual‟s
aspiration level. If the achievement of an aspiration level is not possible, then individuals
are predicted to behave in accordance with prospect theory. Therefore, the results of
Chow et al. (2007) could be supported by both prospect theory and securitypotential/aspiration theory. This study will analyze whether including alternatives that
allow for the attainment of the aspiration level affects risk-taking behaviors.
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2.3 Security-Potential/Aspiration Theory
Security-potential/aspiration (SP|A) theory is a descriptive theory of decisionmaking under risk, which attempts to account for how individuals approach decisions
under risk (Lopes 1987). SP|A theory contains many of the same elements as prospect
theory. For example, SP|A assumes that most individuals are loss-averse and also utilizes
the concept of a reference level. In SP|A, however, the reference level is referred to as an
aspiration level (Lopes 1987, 1990). An aspiration level is an outcome that takes a
special position in the decision process (Diecidue and van de Ven 2008).
Aspiration levels can take many forms. They can be determined by exogenous
factors, such as contract parameters or budget targets, or can be determined by
endogenous factors, such as expectations and knowledge of prior outcomes, or a
combination of the two (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Koszegi and Rabin 2006).
Regardless of how an aspiration level is developed, individuals generally code outcomes
below the aspiration level as failures and outcomes above the aspiration level as
successes. The aspiration level provides a clear delineation between success and failure.
Individuals place value on the overall probability of success and the overall probability of
failure. Empirical research has demonstrated that individuals place a great deal of weight
on the overall probability of success and concludes that this focus on the overall
probability of success is in contrast with expected utility and with prospect theory (Payne
2005). Prior research also suggests decision making models should incorporate overall
probability of success and failure into the models due to the importance individuals place
on it (Payne 2005).
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The focus on the overall probability of success relative to an aspiration level can
also be seen in interviews and field studies of managers. For instance, the response of
one manager in a field study clearly states that an aspiration level plays a vital role in
decision making when he says that “risk is the prospect of not meeting the target of
return,” (Mao 1970, p. 353). In the same study another manager states that “I never
worry about the project going above the return. Risk is what might happen when the
return is going to be less,” (Mao 1970, p. 354). Both of these statements suggest that an
aspiration level, in this case a target rate of return, is a central focus in decision making.
Additionally, subsequent research also suggests that a manager‟s primary focus is placed
on avoiding actions that could potentially place one below some aspiration level (Lopes
1987). In other words, managers focus their attention on actions that put them in danger
of falling below an aspiration level which subsequently makes the opportunities for gains
less salient because the focus is on the danger of losses, not the opportunities for gains.11
The focus on the overall probability of success and failure is a central feature of
SP|A theory and plays a vital role in how individuals select among risky alternatives.
SP|A theory proposes that individuals evaluate alternatives in two stages when making
decisions in uncertain environments (Lopes 1987; Sprinkle et al. 2008). In the first stage,
individuals evaluate possible alternatives by assessing the probability of meeting a
minimum aspiration level. The aspiration level could be some exogenous factor, such as
a budget target, or could be based on endogenous factors, such as an individual‟s
expectations, or a combination of the two. Regardless of how the aspiration level is

11

Petty and Scott (1984) found this idea of a target return among most managers in a more extensive study.
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developed, the aspiration level has special significance for individuals in the decision
process.
In the first stage of SP|A theory, individuals focus their attention on alternatives
that meet the aspiration level with certainty (Lopes 1987). Therefore, individuals focus
on the alternatives that allow them to meet the aspiration level with certainty and reject
all potential alternatives that do not guarantee the attainment of the aspiration level. By
focusing on projects that guarantee the achievement of the aspiration level individuals are
able to remove projects that do not guarantee the aspiration level from consideration in
the decision process. This evaluation illustrates the importance of the probability of
success. If the probability of successfully achieving the aspiration level is in jeopardy for
a particular alternative, then individuals will reject that alternative, thus removing it from
consideration in their decision-making process (Lopes 1987; Lopes and Oden 1999).
SP|A theory suggests that individuals in the first stage of decision making act in a
risk-averse manner, rejecting alternatives that place them in danger of missing the
minimum aspiration level. Individuals will reject high-risk alternatives even if they
contain the highest possible payout or have very high expected values (Lopes 1987;
Sprinkle et al. 2008). Therefore, the focus on the worst possible outcomes may lead
individuals to disregard the “best” possible alternatives, based on probabilities, if there is
even a small chance that this alternative will leave them short of their aspiration level. At
the end of the first stage of the decision process SP|A proposes that individuals have
eliminated projects that do not allow them to meet their aspiration level with certainty.
In the second stage of SP|A theory, the focus switches to potential payoffs.
Specifically, if multiple alternatives meet the aspiration level with certainty, then
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individuals will behave in a more risk-seeking manner. Therefore, of the remaining
alternatives that passed the first stage, individuals will focus now on alternatives that
have the highest possible payoffs.12 Once an individual‟s aspiration level can be met
with certainty (by meeting the first stage criterion) and all of the remaining alternatives
place an individual above the aspiration level, the focus turns to the alternatives with the
highest possible payout. Of the alternatives remaining, those with the highest potential
payout are generally the alternatives with higher variances (risk), and these alternatives
receive more focus in the decision making process, leading to more risk-seeking
behavior.13

First-Stage
Second-Stage

Focus

Risk Behavior

Eliminating projects that
place the aspiration level in
jeopardy
Selecting the project with the
highest possible payoff

Risk-averse – decrease the risk
of failing to attain the aspiration
level
Risk-seeking – select alternative
with highest potential payout

FIGURE 1. Two-Stage Security-Potential/Aspiration Level Theory

The development of SP|A theory is based on empirical evidence demonstrating
the importance of individuals‟ aspiration levels. Early research suggested that

12

Highest potential payoff refers to the highest amount of payment possible from the alternative. This does
not imply that individuals will select the most risky project. This implies that individuals will become more
risk-seeking.
13
When alternatives meet the aspiration level with certainty, individuals will act in a risk-seeking manner
selecting projects that at least allow them the chance to achieve their aspiration level (Lopes 1987).
Therefore, when no alternative guarantees the aspiration level with certainty, individuals will behave in
accordance with prospect theory predictions.
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individual‟s aspiration levels play an important role in effort-related tasks (Stedry 1960).
Subsequent research in a variety of domains led to the proposal of SP|A theory.
Schneider and Lopes (1986) analyzed whether individuals exhibited preference
reversals predicted by prospect theory. The results relating to the gain domain generally
supported prospect theory; individuals tended to act in a risk-averse manner. This result,
while not overly supportive of SP|A, does not rule out SP|A as a descriptive theory of
decision making. Specifically, the risk-averse behavior may have been due to a lack of
alternatives that satisfied the first stage of SP|A. In the first stage of SP|A individuals
eliminate alternatives from consideration that place the aspiration level in jeopardy. If
there are no alternatives that guarantee the attainment of the aspiration level, then
individuals tend to act in a risk-seeking manner, selecting alternatives that at least give
them a chance to attain their aspiration level. This could explain individuals‟ behaviors
in the gain domain. Schneider and Lopes (1986) did show, however, that in the loss
domain, the possibility of losing at least some amount posed a serious threat to the
participant‟s sense of safety (aspiration level). The results exhibited a mixed pattern of
preferences which suggested that participants appeared to dislike lotteries at both
extremes. It appears they disliked the safest option because it would not allow them to
meet their aspiration level and disliked the riskiest option presumably because the threat
to their security is too high and individuals wanted to minimize the chance of the worst
loss (Schneider and Lopes 1986). These results are contrary to prospect theory, which
would suggest that individuals would be risk-seeking in the loss domain.
More recent research has provided more concrete evidence in support of SP|A
theory. Lopes and Oden (1999) analyzed whether the selection of different lotteries was
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better explained by prospect theory or SP|A theory.14 In their experiment they performed
a number of manipulations that shifted, scaled, or moved lotteries around a reference
level. Prospect theory would predict that as long as the outcomes did not cross the
reference level, individuals‟ behavior should not change based on scaling or shifting
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979), whereas SP|A theory would suggest that scaling or
multiplying would affect the evaluation of alternatives because individuals‟ aspiration
levels should change. The results tended to support SP|A theory. Particularly, the data
showed that when individuals‟ aspiration levels were fully satisfied and not in jeopardy
(stage 1) individuals tended to make riskier decisions and selected lotteries with higher
predicted outcomes (stage 2).
Lopes and Oden (1999), however, did not analyze how reference levels changed
over time, which is the focus of this study. Additionally, Lopes and Oden (1999) did not
use financial incentives in their study. Research has shown that financial incentives lead
to more motivation and higher levels of effort (e.g., Vroom 1964, Bonner 2008).
Therefore, the outcomes of individuals‟ decisions may differ in the presence of financial
incentives, which is more indicative of a real world setting. Specifically, firms have
increased their use of monetary incentives in recent years, particularly for upper-level
managers (Wall Street Journal 1999; Bonner 2008). Therefore, the current study is
different than Lopes and Oden (1999) due to the longitudinal experiment and the
inclusion of financial incentives.
The results of Lopes and Oden (1999) are also supported by additional research.
Research examining task types showed that when individuals have multiple alternatives
14

Lopes and Oden (1999) presented participants with alternatives that were not tied to financial incentives.
The alternatives presented hypothetical outcomes.
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that satisfy the aspiration level with certainty (stage 1) individuals are more willing to
take additional risks in their decision process (stage 2) (Mukherjee 2010). In other
words, the two stage process proposed by SP|A theory is empirically supported by
demonstrating that individuals in more complex, engaging tasks showed riskier behavior
when all of the possible outcomes were positive. The results from this study again refute
the prospect theory prediction that individuals in the gain domain will exhibit risk-averse
behavior.
Despite the evidence providing support for SP|A theory, an important question is
how SP|A theory relates to accounting. The relation between accounting and SP|A theory
lies in the aspiration level. Prior research in accounting has suggested that management
accounting practices can have an important influence on an individual‟s aspiration levels,
which will therefore presumably affect performance (Birnberg et al. 2007). A
management accounting example would be whether individuals internalize budget targets
and regard achieving the budget target as a matter of success or failure. In effect, budget
targets can serve as an individual‟s aspiration level. Prior research suggests that an
important question is how budgeting can directly influence levels of aspiration (Birnberg
et al. 2007).
In contrast to all of the research conducted applying prospect theory (e.g.,
Ruchala 1999; Chow et al. 2007; Drake and Kohlmeyer 2010) there is only one study in
accounting that analyzes the applicability or implications of SP|A theory in a budgeting
context (Sprinkle et al. 2008). Sprinkle et al. (2008) analyze the trade-off between effort
and risk taking in the presence of budget-based targets. Specifically, they analyzed how
budget targets, easy or more difficult, as well as costs of effort, affect individuals‟
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propensity to take risks in a single period investment decision setting. Their application
of SP|A theory suggests that individuals with easy budget targets will be more riskseeking than individuals with more difficult budget targets. Specifically they suggest that
easy budget targets will increase the likelihood that more projects will meet the aspiration
level with certainty (stage 1) and will therefore lead to more risk-seeking behavior
because the probability of missing the aspiration level is eliminated (stage 2). Under a
more difficult budget target, however, individuals will strive to achieve the aspiration
level, which will more than likely eliminate many risky projects that jeopardize the
aspiration level (stage 1) and the selection of projects that meet the aspiration level will
only contain less risky options (stage 2).15 Therefore, the focus on the achievement of the
aspiration level leads to more risk-seeking for easy budget targets and more risk-averse
behavior for more difficult budget targets. Their results support these predictions and
thereby support SP|A theory.
Although Sprinkle et al. (2008) analyzed the applicability of SP|A theory in an
accounting context, they did not examine how individuals‟ reference levels would affect
subsequent risky decision making and this limitation was noted by the authors.
Therefore, this study will examine how changes in individuals‟ reference levels affects
subsequent risky decision making behavior. It could be that over time individuals
reference levels change, which would affect subsequent decision making. A multi-period
examination will provide further evidence.

15

This statement assumes that there are projects that will guarantee the attainment of the budget target
under a moderately difficult budget target. In scenarios where this is not the case, individuals will be
forced to be risk-seeking in order to increase their probability of attaining the budget target, as is the case
with difficult but attainable budget targets.
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2.4 Reference Levels
Although there is empirical evidence supporting both prospect theory and SP|A
theory, there is a limitation that applies to both theories. This limitation, noted by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and other researchers (e.g. Koszegi and Rabin 2006;
Wakker 2010) relates to the psychological feature of reference dependence. Prospect
theory suggests that individuals judge outcomes relative to some comparison point, which
divides possible outcomes into regions of gain and loss. In prospect theory, this
comparison point is known as the reference point. When prospect theory was first
developed, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) recognized that an individual‟s reference point
may shift due to one‟s expectations or aspiration level (p. 286). SP|A theory suggests that
alternatives are evaluated based on whether or not they meet the aspiration level, which
also makes SP|A theory a reference-dependent theory.16
Most of the research related to prospect theory and to SP|A theory, however,
generally assumes that individuals‟ reference levels have already been determined and
are fixed (Wakker 2010). This assumption may be especially true in single-period
settings, yet Tversky and Kahneman (1992) recognized that reference levels may shift
due to prior experiences, which suggests that over multiple periods individuals‟ reference
level may not remain fixed. Therefore the assumption of a fixed and predetermined
reference level does not allow for the fact that individuals‟ reference levels may shift over

16

Reference level, as used in this study, incorporates both reference points (prospect theory) and aspiration
levels (security-potential/aspiration level theory).
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time, thus leading to possible changes in risk behavior that have not been accounted for in
prior accounting literature.17
The reliance on the assumption of a fixed and predetermined reference level also
revolved around the lack of theory positing how individuals‟ reference levels were
determined. Without a testable theory describing how to identify the reference level the
assumption of the reference level as the status quo was adequate. Early theories of
decision making pointed out that there was no theory for the location of reference levels
and considered this to be a weak point of decision theory (Markowitz 1952).
At prospect theory‟s conception, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed that an
individual‟s reference level could be related to a number of external or internal factors.
These factors include an individual‟s expectations, aspiration level, exogenously set
contract parameters, prior outcomes, etc. (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Thaler and
Johnson 1990). Tversky and Kahneman (1991) developed a theory of referencedependence for consumer behavior that attempts to explain how an individual‟s
preferences would change when their reference levels change, but did not identify how a
reference level is determined.18 The evolution of prospect theory has led academics to
develop a theory relating to how reference levels are determined. This development now
17

Although Ruchala (1999) and Drake and Kohlmeyer (2010) examined prior outcomes and the effects on
behavior, both studies were single period and prior outcomes were manipulated and not based on actual
decisions made by individuals which removes some level of individual control from the experiments,
especially in a multi-period experiment. Additionally, neither study measured individuals‟ reference levels
and cannot attribute the change in behavior to a change in reference level. Sprinkle et al. (2008) examined
a single period setting and whether SP|A theory could explain individual risk-taking behavior. The current
study extends this line of research by examining a multi-period setting where individuals make their own
decisions and reference levels are recorded.
18
Tversky and Kahneman‟s (1991) reference-dependent theory was able to account for two well
established violations of prospect theory, the status quo bias and the endowment effect. The status quo bias
occurs when individual decision makers attach additional value to their default options or status quo choice
(Ortoleva 2010). The endowment effect refers to the fact that individuals demand much more to give up an
object that they own than they are willing to spend in order to acquire the same object (Huck, Kirchsteiger,
and Oechssler 2005)
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allows researchers to examine how possible changes in reference levels can affect
behaviors in a number of settings.
Additionally, many researchers in economics are hesitant to apply prospect theory
because they are forced to specify a reference level yet psychological principles about
plausible reference levels provide little guidance (Hastie 2001). Various authors have
proposed that norms, expectations, levels of aspiration, foregone alternatives, and social
comparisons can function as an individual‟s reference level (Luce, Mellers, and Change
1993; Heath, Larrick, and Wu 1999; Thaler 1999).
Prior to the development of a testable theory, a number of studies began to
analyze possible factors that could affect an individual‟s reference level. McCusker and
Carnevale (1995) investigated a resource allocation dilemma and found that expectations
driven by a sanction system shifted reference levels, subsequently effecting individuals‟
contributions.19 These results suggest that exogenous factors, such as a sanction system,
as well as expectations derived from exogenous factors, can influence reference levels.
Carnevale (2008) and Seo, Goldfarb, and Barrett (2010) analyzed how affect could
impact reference levels. Both studies indicate that affect can influence the location of a
reference level in evaluating prospective outcomes by altering individuals risk attitudes
depending on their affective reactions to prior events.20
Research in finance has analyzed reference levels for stocks and stock valuations.
Shefrin and Statman (1985) illustrated that the purchase price of a security serves as a
19

The sanction system provided rewards and penalties for individual‟s contributions to the dilemma, either
a public goods dilemma or a common dilemma.
20
In general, Seo et al. (2010) find a moderating effect of affect on risk taking. Specifically, when
individuals have pleasant (unpleasant) affect in the gain domain they are more (less) likely to take on risk.
Conversely, individuals in the loss domain are less (more) likely to be risk-seeking when they have pleasant
(unpleasant) affect.
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reference level for individuals. This contention was supported by Odean (1998), who
also suggested that an individual‟s reference price for securities can change over time,
albeit sluggishly. Gneezy (2005) extended this line of research by examining the most
likely reference price individuals use in valuing stocks. The experimental results suggest
that individuals are most likely to use the historical peak price of the stock as a reference
price.
More recently, Arkes et al. (2008, 2010) and Baucells, Weber, and Welfens
(2011) began answering questions about how reference prices for stocks changed based
on whether stock prices increased or decreased. Using questionnaire data and real
monetary incentives, Arkes et al. (2008, 2010) noted that individuals integrated increases
in stock price into their reference levels faster than they integrated decreases in the stock
price. Specifically, after participants viewed changes in stock prices, they incorporated
gains into their reference levels more than losses, and this was especially true when
individuals were forced to sell the stock and realize the gain or loss.
Extending Arkes et al. (2008, 2010), Baucells et al. (2011) estimated a model for
the formulation of reference levels relating to stock prices. Their model incorporates a
number of factors that they find influence individual‟s reference price: purchase price,
most recent price, and the intermediate prices seen by individuals. The purchase price
and most recent price in their experiment and model development carried the most weight
in the formulation of reference prices while intermediate weights (prices seen during the
course of the experiment) received smaller weight. Baucells et al. (2011) is an important
development in reference level research, as it is the first article to develop an actual
model representing how reference levels are developed. Baucells et al. (2011) conclude
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that the model developed is a reasonably good fit for the data and provides an avenue for
future research to examine how reference levels are determined in domains other than
stock valuations.
Although research has examined reference levels in the stock price domain, there
are a number of differences between a stock investment setting and a budget-based
compensation setting. In stock investment settings, individuals expect constant
fluctuations in prices, and the results from that study may not generalize to an economic
setting using budget targets and wages. Another key difference between the two settings
is controllability. Individuals have more control over budget target attainment than they
do over the stock price. Although individuals are able to select stocks in which to invest,
they have no control over whether the stock price will increase or decrease. In an
economic setting with budget targets and wages, individuals have control over which
alternatives to select and the selection of alternatives has a direct effect on the attainment
(failure to attain) of the budget target. In addition, individuals do not „expect‟ to not
attain their budget target, and therefore, the failure to attain the budget target may have
more of an effect in this setting compared to a stock investment setting where there is an
expectation that stock prices can fluctuate both up and down.
Additionally, mental accounting theory suggests that individuals categorize gains
and losses into various mental accounts (Thaler 1985, 1999). Research has suggested
that the mental accounts individuals use for investments is separate and distinct from the
accounts used for income (Thaler 1999). Specifically, prior research has demonstrated
that investors leave their mental accounts open indefinitely when their investment has
paper losses so that they can avoid the pain associated with a realized loss (Arkes et al.
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2008, 2010; Fennema and Koonce 2011). This finding suggests that in a stock
investment setting, individuals have the ability to put off closing their mental account
until gains and losses are actually realized. In a budget-based compensation setting,
however, individuals will realize their gain (attainment of budget target) or loss (failure to
attain budget target) in the period of their investment decision.21 In other words,
individuals do not have the option to leave their mental accounts open for an indefinite
period of time to avoid the pain associated with realized losses like they would in a stock
investment setting.
Prior research in accounting has suggested that attaining or not attaining a budget
target or performance goal can affect subsequent risk decisions (Ruchala 1999; Drake and
Kohlmeyer 2010). Both of these studies manipulated the attainment of the budget goal so
that individuals‟ decisions did not dictate whether the budget goal was attained or not.
One possibility not examined in prior research is that prior performance and
concomitantly the success or failure of attaining the budget target can affect individuals‟
reference levels. This study will extend this line of research by investigating not only
how attaining (not attaining) a budget target affects future behavior but also how
attaining (not attaining) the target is impounded into reference levels over multiple
periods.

21

The experimental setting provides feedback for economic outcomes each period. Every investment
decision lasts for one year (a single period) and then another investment decision is made in the following
period, which lasts for one year.
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2.4.1 Expectations-Based Reference-Dependent Preferences Theory
One of the shortcomings of decision theory is the lack of a theory relating to how
reference levels are determined.22 Tversky and Kahneman (1991) developed a reference
dependent theory but address how individuals react to deviations from the reference
level, not how reference levels are determined. They treat the reference level as
exogenously determined, which is adequate for explaining most experimental and survey
data, but limits the applicability of the theory. In an attempt at addressing this, Koszegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007) developed expectations-based reference-dependent preferences,
which is a reference dependent theory that extends prior work in prospect theory.23
Reference-dependent preferences assumes that an individual‟s reference level is
developed based on his or her rational expectations, rather than the status-quo. This does
not imply that the reference level is not determined, at least in part, by exogenous factors.
On the contrary, if an individual has no prior rational expectations, then their reference
level should be determined mostly on exogenous factors, such as a budget target. An
individual‟s rational expectations are based on beliefs and perceptions developed in the
recent past about outcomes. For instance, rational expectations for future periods could
be based on economic outcomes received in a prior period, such as wages paid. In other
words, an individual‟s expectations are used to develop the reference level. Referencedependent preferences specifies that an individual‟s reference level is determined
endogenously by the economic environment. Therefore, exogenous features, such as
contract parameters, are internalized and used in conjunction with an individual‟s rational
22

The lack of specification of how reference levels are developed applies to SP|A theory and aspiration
levels as well as prospect theory and reference points.
23
For the remainder of the study, expectations-based reference-dependent preferences will be referred to
only as reference-dependent preferences.
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expectations to set the reference level (Koszegi and Rabin 2006). It should be noted that
reference-dependent preferences makes an extreme assumption that the reference level is
fully determined by the expectations a person held in the recent past.
The idea that expectations can determine the reference level is not new. Tversky
and Kahneman (1981) stated that “a diversity of factors determine the reference outcome
in everyday life. The reference outcome is usually a state to which one has adapted; it is
sometimes set by social norms and expectations; it sometimes corresponds to a level of
aspiration, which may or may not be realistic,” (p. 456). The importance of referencedependent preferences is the formalization of a model that describes general rules on how
individuals set their reference levels in a number of settings.
Reference-dependent preferences model has a number of appealing features.
First, the model indicates that an individual‟s utility function has two components,
standard consumption utility and gain-loss utility (Koszegi and Rabin 2006; Parra 2010).
Standard consumption utility relates to the prospect theory idea that utility is derived
from current payments and current efforts. This can be thought of as the material payoff
(Daido and Itoh 2010). The additional form of utility, gain-loss utility is derived from
departures from a reference level. To illustrate, consider the following example. A
worker is expecting to get paid $50,000 this year, which is based on his/her rational
expectations from prior outcomes. Instead of $50,000, the worker receives $40,000.24 In
terms of standard consumption utility, the worker would evaluate utility based on the
receipt of $40,000, in accordance with standard prospect theory. Gain-loss utility, on the
other hand, captures differences in an individual‟s expectations (reference level) and
24

The reason for the decrease in salary is irrelevant for this example highlighting the difference between
the two utility functions.
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realized outcomes. In this case, an individual would perceive the $40,000 as a $10,000
loss based on the expectation of receiving $50,000.
In addition to incorporating an additional form of utility, reference-dependent
preferences also makes a number of assumptions. Particularly, Koszegi and Rabin (2006)
specify the notion of personal equilibrium, which assumes an individual correctly
interprets the environment he/she is in and correctly predicts his/her own reaction to the
environment given the reference level generated by his/her expectations. Personal
equilibrium means that individuals know their reference level, and given that reference
level will select an option that is consistent with expectations. Koszegi and Rabin (2006)
extend upon the idea of personal equilibrium and introduce the concept of preferred
personal equilibrium, which in essence requires the decision maker to select the personal
equilibrium plan with the highest ex ante expected utility.
The reference-dependent preferences model was developed and applied
analytically to consumer behavior and labor market supply by Koszegi and Rabin (2006).
In general, by specifying the determination of the reference level based on expectations,
and not the status quo, Koszegi and Rabin (2006) demonstrate that there is a relationship
between an individual‟s expectations of purchase (a reference level), price expectations (a
reference level) and willingness to purchase (behavior). Specifically, they analytically
demonstrate that as an individual‟s expectation of purchase and price expectations
conditional on purchase increase, so too does the willingness to pay for a good. If an
individual expects to purchase a good and has certain expectations of the price, these
expectations influence an individual‟s willingness to purchase a good.
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Decision Making

Outcomes

FIGURE 2. Expectations-Based Reference-Dependent Preferences Theory

Applying the reference-dependent preferences model to a labor supply decision,
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) demonstrate that expectations of earned income affect
individuals‟ decisions to work. They show that if income earned is unexpectedly high, a
worker is less likely to continue to work because their expectations have already been
met. Specifically, they examine cab driver labor supply and apply reference-dependent
preferences by inferring that cab drivers have endogenously set income targets. For
instance, a driver who averages $200 a day will have an endogenously set reference level
close to $200. Therefore, a driver with a $200 reference level who makes $1,000 in the
morning will be less likely to continue working because their reference level has already
been met. Additionally, if expected income is high, for example $400, an individual is
more likely to show up for work and continue to work, due to the expectation of high
income for the day.
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) demonstrated analytically the applicability of
reference-dependent preferences. Since its development, reference-dependent
preferences has been analytically applied to a number of domains. For instance, research
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has examined price competition among firms with loss-averse consumers and assumes in
these models that consumers are loss-averse relative to a reference level, which is
determined based on consumers‟ recent expectations about purchases (Heidhues and
Koszegi 2008). More importantly for this study, reference-dependent preferences has
been analytically modeled in a principal-agent, moral hazard context. Daido and Itoh
(2010) analyze the interaction between reference-dependent preferences and incentives
with the main focus revolving around an agent‟s effort. They show analytically that an
agent‟s higher expectations allow the principal to use lower-powered incentives while
still receiving high levels of effort from the agent. An agent with high expectations about
his/her performance can be induced to choose high levels of effort with low-powered
incentives, which illustrates how expectations of performance can affect individuals‟
behaviors.
One of the interesting contributions of Daido and Itoh (2010) is the proposition of
how individual‟s reference levels are determined in a principal-agent context. The
authors propose that an agent‟s reference level is determined by his or her expectations
about the effort level chosen and the resulting success probability of the project. This
specification focuses the analysis more on effort than monetary payoffs.
In addition to analytical analysis, recent empirical work has demonstrated that
expectations can and do serve some function in the development of reference levels.
Smith (2008) examined experimentally whether individuals‟ expectations could explain
the endowment effect and found that expectations can provide a rational explanation for
the endowment effect. Specifically, individuals who are told they “own” an object
develop expectations of keeping the object. The expectation of keeping the object
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increases the value individuals place on the object, thus leading to a higher reference
level than if the reference level was just the status quo.25 Ericson and Fuster (2011)
expand on this line of research and show that increasing individuals‟ expectations of
ownership affects exchange behavior and valuation. The results support the assertion that
expectations, at least in part, influence the determination of the reference level.
Extending the empirical tests of reference-dependent preferences, Gill and Prowse
(2010) conduct a sequential move tournament experiment and demonstrate that during
competition (tournament incentive scheme) individuals have reference levels that are
determined by their monetary payoffs and these reference levels are also affected by the
choices and outcomes of other competitors.26 This evidence suggests that monetary
payoffs may in fact be incorporated into individual‟s reference levels. However, these
results also suggest that the incorporation of monetary payoffs into reference levels may
be contingent on competition.27
There is additional empirical evidence that contract parameters may play a role in
the determination of reference levels. Abeler, Falk, Goette, and Huffman (2011) analyze
individuals‟ effort levels based on two different forms of contracts. The authors
manipulated the amount of fixed wage being offered to participants and informed
participants that there is a 50 percent probability they will receive the fixed wage or a 50
percent probability they will receive a piece-rate wage that is determined by their output.
Reference-dependent preferences would suggest that if expectations are influential in the
25

In the current study, the status quo would be the base wage associated with not attaining the budget target
in the initial period.
26
Gill and Prowse (2010) focus on disappointment aversion in a real effort tournament. Focus on whether
individuals who exert effort at a task for a prize reveal disappointment aversion in subsequent tasks.
27
This is based on social comparison theory (Festinger 1954). Under social comparison theory, individuals
compare their outcomes to other‟s outcomes. Competition exacerbates this comparison.
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determination of the reference level, individuals would stay closer to the fixed wage
amount because they do not want to exert effort to earn the piece rate when there is a 50
percent probability they will be paid a fixed wage. The results of the experiment
demonstrated that individuals in the two distinct fixed wage conditions remained close to
the fixed wage amount, suggesting that expectations of future economic outcomes, either
the receipt of the fixed wage or the receipt of the piece rate, influence the formulation of
individuals‟ reference levels.
The evidence presented above suggests that expectations play at least a part in the
formulation of reference levels. One of the open questions remaining in this literature
stream is what constitutes recent expectations. Daido and Itoh (2010) suggest that recent
expectations relate to effort and the probability of success related to the outcome.
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) suggest recent expectations relating to purchases. This study
will extend this literature by examining recent expectations relating to economic
payments based on a budget-target compensation contract that incorporates a bonus for
attaining the budget target. Specifically, this study will analyze whether individuals‟
reference levels adjust over time based on prior performance relative to their assigned
budget target (economic outcomes), which may impact the effectiveness of budget-based
contracts.
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3.0 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

3.1 Single Period Risky Decision Making Behavior
Despite all of the evidence supporting SP|A theory, there is only one study in
accounting that analyzes the applicability of SP|A theory in a budgeting context.
Sprinkle et al. (2008) analyze the trade-off between risk taking and effort in the presence
of budget-based contracts in a single period investment decision setting. Their
application of SP|A suggests that individuals with easy budget targets will be more riskseeking than individuals with more difficult budget targets. Specifically, they suggest
that easy budget targets will increase the likelihood that more projects will meet the
aspiration level with certainty (Stage 1 of SP|A theory) and will therefore lead to more
risk-seeking behavior because the probability of missing the aspiration level is eliminated
(Lopes and Oden 1999; Sprinkle et al. 2008). Under easy budget targets there will be
more projects that allow for the guaranteed attainment of the budget target, which implies
that more projects will pass stage 1 of the decision making process. This suggests that
individuals place a great deal of weight on the overall probability of success, illustrated
here by the guaranteed attainment of the aspiration level (Payne 2005). Therefore, in
stage 2, when individuals are suggested to behave in a more risk-seeking manner, there
will be more projects from which a selection can be made and individuals will tend to
select the alternative with the highest possible payoff.
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Under a moderate budget target, individuals will also strive to attain their
aspiration level, which will more than likely eliminate many risky projects that will
jeopardize the attainment of the aspiration level (stage 1 of SP|A theory) and the selection
of alternatives that meet the aspiration level will only contain less risky options (stage 2).
Therefore, the focus on the achievement of the aspiration level leads to more risk-seeking
behavior for easy budget targets compared to moderate budget targets.
Sprinkle et al. (2008) incorporate a cost of effort component to analyze whether
there is a trade-off between risky decision making and effort selection. In the current
study, the cost of effort is removed. Therefore, the following hypothesis is necessary to
test whether SP|A predictions are applicable to situations where the only consideration is
risk and not the cost of effort. Based on SP|A theory, the following hypothesis predicts
that individuals under easy budget targets will exhibit more risk-seeking behavior
because more projects will pass stage 1 of the decision making process, thus leaving
more alternatives in stage 2 where individuals will switch their focus to alternatives with
the highest possible outcomes. Under moderate budget targets there will be fewer
alternatives that pass stage 1, and the alternatives that do pass stage 1 will generally be
the ones with smaller variances, and thus contain less risk, thus leading to more riskaverse selections.28 Therefore, I hypothesize the following:
H1: In an initial task undertaking, individuals with easy budget targets
will exhibit more risk taking than individuals with moderate budget
targets.

28

This argument and the accompanying hypothesis is based purely on SP|A theoretical predictions. In
most situations, there will be few, if any projects that guarantee the attainment of a moderate or difficult
budget target.
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3.2 Changes in Reference Levels and Decision Making over Multiple Periods
A significant caveat in the application of decision theory is the assumption that
reference levels are constant and fixed (Koszegi and Rabin 2006; Wakker 2010). This
assumption is not supported by theory, however, as Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
recognized that individuals‟ reference levels may shift over time due to expectations or
aspiration levels. The assumption of fixed and constant reference levels may hold true in
single period settings where individuals make a single decision based on some reference
level that is determined based on exogenous factors, whereby expectations of future
performance are not yet formulated.
In multiple periods, however, individuals tend to develop expectations of future
outcomes. Prior research has noted that expectations, such as expectations of purchase,
expectations of daily income, consumers‟ recent expectations of purchases, employees‟
expectations of performance, expectations of ownership serve as important inputs to the
formulation of individuals‟ reference levels (Koszegi and Rabin 2006; Heidhues and
Koszegi 2008; Smith 2008; Daido and Itoh 2010). Therefore, reference-dependent
preferences theory postulates that expectations play a vital role in the formulation of
individuals‟ reference levels.
One of the open questions remaining in this literature stream is what constitutes
recent expectations. Daido and Itoh (2010) suggest that recent expectations relate to
effort and the probability of success related to the outcome. Koszegi and Rabin (2006)
suggest that recent expectations can relate to consumer expectations of purchases. This
study will extend this literature by examining recent expectations relating to economic
payments based on a budget-based compensation contract that incorporates budget
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targets. Specifically, this study will analyze whether individuals‟ reference levels adjust
over time based on prior performance relative to their assigned budget target (economic
outcomes), which may impact the effectiveness of budget-based contracts.
A key question relating to reference levels is how the reference level is
determined in different contexts. For example, in a budget target setting, an individual
could rely on a number of outcomes or options in setting their reference level.
Specifically, an individual, particularly in an initial task undertaking, could have a
reference level that directly corresponds to the budget target level. 29 In most budgetbased compensation contracts, financial incentives are tied to the budget target. It is
therefore likely that in a budget-based contract individuals will use the budget target as
their reference level. Indeed, prior research suggests that individuals use budget targets
as their reference levels in initial task undertakings (Heath et al. 1999; Sprinkle et al.
2008; Larrick et al. 2009). This suggests the possibility that individuals may not adjust
their reference levels but rather may adopt their budget target as their reference level and
retain the budget target level as their status quo reference level.
On the other hand, over time individuals also receive wages in the form of base
salaries and possible bonuses relating to the attainment of budget targets. Therefore, it is
possible that individuals will begin to develop expectations of future payment that could
affect their reference level. Subsequently, individuals who continually achieve the
budget target may adjust their reference level to incorporate their expectations of future
payments based on recent prior outcomes. Indeed, prior research suggests that prior
outcomes have an effect on individuals‟ subsequent risk decisions, and the change in
29

This would imply a reference level that is equal to the monetary amount for exactly meeting the budget
target, which would be the annual base salary.
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risky behavior may be due to changes in individuals‟ reference level (Ruchala 1999;
Drake and Kohlmeyer 2010). This research suggests it is plausible that individuals
incorporate their expectations of future economic payments into their reference levels
based on outcomes of prior periods.
Based on the preceding discussion, reference-dependent preferences theory would
suggest that individuals‟ reference levels are at least in part formulated based on
endogenously created rational expectations. In an economic setting, these rational
expectations can be based on expectations of future economic outcomes, for instance
compensation. Therefore, the following hypotheses will examine whether individuals in
an economic setting set their reference level based on expectations developed from recent
prior experiences relating to their actual financial outcomes or whether they simply rely
on a status quo reference level, which in this case should be the budget target. If
individuals adjust their reference levels over time in response to expectations of future
economic outcomes based on prior experience, then individuals who attain their budget
target and receive their base salary plus some amount of variable bonus payment would
be expected to show the greatest reference level adjustment. The probability of attaining
the budget target is more likely under an easy budget target, yet individuals in the
moderate budget condition can select projects that also allow guaranteed attainment of
the budget target. Therefore, hypothesis two predicts that individuals who continually
attain the budget target will exhibit a greater shift in their reference level because they
have received higher levels of payment and have a greater possibility of impounding their
expectations of future economic outcomes into their reference levels. To test whether
individuals‟ reference levels change over time the following hypothesis is presented.
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H2:

The greater the frequency by which individuals attain the budget
target, the greater the increase in their reference level.

The above hypothesis is designed to test whether reference levels change
over time. It does not specify how changes in individuals‟ reference levels will
change behavior. If hypothesis two is not supported, that would suggest that
individuals anchor on the designated budget target and expectations do not affect
their reference level or risk taking decisions. If, however, reference levels do
change over time, this change allows for additional examination of how
individuals adjust their behavior with respect to changes in their reference level.
If individuals follow SP|A theory‟s predictions, then an upward shift in an
individual‟s reference level will lead to more risk-averse behavior. According to SP|A,
when an aspiration level increases, the number of alternatives which ensure the aspiration
level will be achieved will decrease, most likely eliminating more risky projects in the
first stage of project evaluation.30 Individuals who continually attain the budget target are
more likely to impound their expectations of future economic outcomes into their
reference levels. Therefore, in the second stage of project evaluation individuals will have
fewer risky options to select from, thus leading them to exhibit more risk-averse behavior
than if their aspiration levels did not change. In order to test this prediction based on
SP|A, the following hypothesis is presented.
H3:

With knowledge of prior economic outcomes, individuals who
have continually attained the budget target will exhibit less risk
taking in a task repetition than in an initial task undertaking.

30

Recall, under SP|A individuals evaluate projects in two stages. In the first stage the focus is on the
attainment of the aspiration level. In the second stage, the focus is on maximizing potential payoffs.
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4.0 METHOD

The experimental design is a 1 X 2 between-subjects design which incorporates
five experimental periods. The between-subjects variable, budget target is manipulated at
two levels: easy and moderate. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two
manipulated conditions. All experimental sessions were conducted in a controlled
laboratory setting. The experimental task is a modification of Sprinkle et al. (2008).
4.1 Experimental Participants
Participants for this experiment were from a large southeastern United States
university. The participant pool was upper-level undergraduate accounting students.
Due to the nature of the task, upper-level undergraduate accounting students were
suitable participants. Remus (1986) suggests that students are adequate proxies for
managers in experiments involving decision-making tasks. This finding is further
supported by research that suggests that students are likely to be better surrogates for
managers in experiments involving decision-making tasks than in experiments that
examine attitudes and attitude changes (Ashton and Kramer 1980; Houghton and
Hronsky 1993). In addition, Trottier and Gordon (2011) suggest that the magnitude of
the effect may differ between student proxies and managers but the inferences from the
experimental results generally remain unchanged. This suggests that differences between
student proxies and managers may have differences in absolute magnitude but do not
change the inferences from the study itself.
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In addition, experience in selecting projects is consistent with individuals
selecting from a series of lotteries. In selecting projects to invest in or lotteries,
individuals consider the downside risk, upside risk, and then make a selection (Shapira,
1994). Therefore, upper-level undergraduate accounting students were an appropriate
participant pool for this experiment because experience in the task was not expected to
interact with any variables of interest (Peecher and Solomon 2001).
4.2 Experimental Variables
4.2.1 Independent Variables
The independent variable in this study is budget target difficulty which was
manipulated at two levels: easy and moderate. Budget target difficulty was manipulated
in two ways. The first manipulation relates the amount of base salary that individuals
receive in the budget target conditions. In the easy budget target condition individuals
receive a base salary of 15,000 Lira. The base salary in the moderate budget target
condition is 30,000 Lira. The difference in base salary incorporates the notion of
uncertainty in pay for the moderate budget target condition, thus leading to a higher base
salary. In the moderate budget condition there are fewer projects that allow guaranteed
attainment of the budget target. Therefore, the moderate budget target condition
incorporates a higher base salary due to the greater uncertainty in pay, which is consistent
with the compensation literature, which suggests that increases in the variability of
compensation should be somewhat offset by increases in the base salary (Milgrom and
Roberts 1992).
The main manipulation of budget target difficulty relates to the differences in the
probability of attaining the budget target between the conditions. In the easy budget
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target condition five of the seven projects allow guaranteed attainment of the budget
target. Only the two riskiest projects do not allow guaranteed attainment of the budget
target. In the moderate budget target condition, on the other hand, only two of the seven
projects allow guaranteed attainment of the budget target. Only the two least risky
projects allow for guaranteed attainment of the budget target. Therefore, this
manipulation incorporates the idea that when budget targets are not set to easily
attainable levels, there will be fewer alternatives that allow guaranteed attainment of the
budget target.
4.2.2 Dependent Variables
There are a number of dependent variables used to test the hypotheses. The
dependent variable for hypothesis one is based on the project that individuals select in the
first period. Each project presented has a variance, which represents the level of risk that
a particular project has. The use of variance as a proxy for project risk is analogous to
prior research (Chow and Haddad 1991; Sayre, Rankin, and Fargher 1998; Chow et al.
2007; Drake and Kohlmeyer 2010) and is based on the vast literatures in finance dealing
with decision making under risk and uncertainty. The variance of each project, which is
operationalized as the difference between the highest and lowest amounts paid if the
budget is met, is impacted by a number of components. The variance in the amount of
payments that can be received from attaining the budget target are impacted by three
components: (1) the amount of base salary an individual will receive if the budget target
is missed, (2) the lowest amount paid if the budget target is met, and (3) the probability of
attaining the budget target.
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The amount of base salary is determined by the budget condition: 15,000 in the
easy budget condition and 30,000 in the moderate budget target condition. This amount
remains consistent for all projects within a particular budget target condition. The
lowest amount paid if the budget target is met is consistent across conditions and
decreases as the amount of risk in a project increases. Specifically, the lowest amount
paid if the budget target is met for the least risky project is 182,500 Lira, while the lowest
amount paid if the budget target is met for the most risky project is 40,000 Lira.
The last component of the variance is the probability of attaining the budget
target. This component simulates downside risk, which is the probability of the worst
case scenario occurring, in this case missing the budget target (Shapira 1994). The
probability of attaining the budget target impacts the highest amount that can be received
if the budget target is attained. Specifically, all projects presented have equivalent
expected values of 185,000 Lira. Therefore, the components mentioned above all impact
the value of the highest amount that can be received if the budget target is met. The
probability of attaining the budget target, in particular, dictates the percentage chance that
an individual will or will not attain the budget target. This, in turn, dictates whether the
individual will receive the base salary if the budget target is not attained, or some equally
likely number within the range of the lowest and highest amounts paid if the budget
target is met.
The variance, as described above, is measured as the difference between the
lowest and highest amounts paid if the budget target is attained because this difference
captures the parameters that are used to define risk in this study. Therefore, the variance
of a particular project selected is used as the dependent variable for hypothesis one.
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Although the variances of projects differ across the experimental conditions, the
variances are designed to bias against finding results for hypothesis one. Attempts were
made to create equal variances for each project, however, this lead to unequal expected
values of the projects. Therefore, the decision was made to include variances that differ
between experimental conditions, which bias against results, rather than to present
projects that varied in expected value.
The dependent variable for hypothesis two is the change in an individual‟s
reference level. Before the main experiment, individuals answered the following
question, “At what level of payment would you have neither positive nor negative
emotion?” The answer to this question serves as an individual‟s baseline reference level,
or reference level at time t = 0. This question was asked after participants were informed
of their compensation contract. After each period of the main experiment individuals
answered this question again, thus creating reference levels at times, t = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The
dependent variable, change in reference level, is measured as the difference between an
individual‟s reference level at t = 5 and the baseline reference level, t= 0. Additional
measures were created for sensitivity analysis but the results of hypothesis two are
presented based on the measurement described above.
The dependent variable for hypothesis three assesses whether individuals exhibit a
change in risk-taking behavior over time. This variable is measured as the difference
between an individual‟s project selection in period 1 versus the project selection in period
5. Thus, this measure will capture the difference in the level of risk an individual was
willing to take over time.
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4.2.3 Control Variables
There are a number of control variables that were measured during the
experiment. The first control variable was individuals‟ innate risk preferences.
Individuals can have differing attitudes towards risk, which may impact their selection of
risky alternatives. Therefore, a risk preference task from Holt and Laury (2002) was
included to capture individual risk preferences. This scale requires individuals to select
between two alternatives. One of the alternatives was more “safe” while another was
more “risky.” In total ten selections were made. Individuals‟ innate risk preference was
measured as the number of risky choices made out of the ten selections. Therefore, a
higher score on the risk preference scale indicated that the individual is more riskseeking.
A loss-aversion scale from Brink and Rankin (2011) was included to measure
individuals‟ innate loss aversion. The scale is similar to the risk preference scale and
required individuals to select between two alternatives. The difference, however, is that
the alternatives in the loss aversion scale vary the amount of possible loss that an
individual could incur. Specifically, one option presented a small gain versus a small
loss, and the expected value of the outcome was zero. The other option presented a
positive gain of $6.67 versus increasing levels of losses. As participants moved down the
scale, the possible loss from this option increased to the point where the loss was larger
than the possible gain of $6.67. An individual‟s innate loss-aversion was measured as the
number of loss-averse selections made. Therefore, a higher score on the loss-aversion
scale indicates that the individual is more loss-averse. An individual who is extremely
averse to losses may only select less risky projects. On the other hand, individuals who
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are not averse to losses may select riskier projects. Therefore, this measure was included
to rule out this possibility.
In the proposed statistical analysis of hypothesis two and hypothesis three, a
control variable for future expectations was included in the analysis. To assess future
expectations, individuals were asked the following question: “What do you think the
outcome of your decision in the next period will be?” This question was asked after
every period of the main experimental task. This question was included to capture
individual‟s expectations of future economic outcomes, that is, their expectation of the
outcome in the next period. According to expectations-based reference dependent
preferences, expectations of future economic events influence the setting of individuals‟
reference levels. Therefore, it is necessary to control for individuals‟ future expectations
of economic outcomes.31
In the analysis, future expectations are always related to the period before the
reference level period. For example, in hypothesis two, future expectations recorded
after period four were included in the statistical tests. The dependent variable for
hypothesis two is the change in reference level comparing the baseline reference level in
period zero to the reference level reported in period five. Therefore, the future
expectations from the period before the final reference level measure were included in the
statistical analysis. Participants‟ future expectations for a particular period always lagged
one period behind the reference level period.

31

Future expectations were not significant in any hypothesis test. Therefore, it is not presented in the tests
of hypotheses.
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Variable Name
Dependent Variables
Project Selection
Variance
Change in Project
Selection Variance

Question/Definition
The variance of the project a participant selects
The difference between the project variance in period 5 and
the project variance in period 1

Reference Level

At what level of payment would you have neither positive
nor negative emotion?

Change in Reference
Level
Independent Variable
Budget Condition

Difference between current period reference level and the
baseline reference level at t = 0

Attained Budget Target

Count variable which adds the number of times an individual
has attained the budget target. Different depending on the
period of interest

Covariates
Risk Preference

Loss Aversion

Economic Outcome

Two budget target levels: easy and moderate. Manipulated
through annual base salary (15,000 – easy, 30,000 –
moderate) and probability of meeting the budget target.

Measured using the Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference
task which captures individual‟s innate risk preferences.
Measure ranges from 0 – 10, with higher scores representing
more risk-seeking.
Measured using the Brink and Rankin (2011) loss aversion
task which captures individual‟s innate loss aversion.
Measure ranges from 0 – 10, with higher scores representing
more loss aversion.
Participant compensation for a period, presented in Lira

Attained Budget Targett=i

Dichotomous variable equal to one if participant attained the
budget target in period I and equal to zero if not.

Future Expectations

What do you think the outcome of your decision in the next
period will be?

FIGURE 3. Variable Definition

The last control variable is economic outcome. This variable was also included as
a control variable for hypothesis two and hypothesis three. Economic outcome relates to
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the outcome an individual had in a prior period. According to expectations-based
reference dependent preferences, outcomes of prior decisions impact the setting of
individuals‟ reference levels. In the statistical analysis, economic outcomes are always
related to the reference level period. For example, if change in reference level is
comparing the reference level from period zero to period five, then economic outcomes
would be measured as the economic outcome from an individual‟s decision in period
five.
An alternative measure for economic outcomes was based on whether or not an
individual attained the budget target in the prior period. Therefore, Attained Budget
Target was a dichotomous variable equal to one if an individual attained the budget target
and zero if they failed to attain the budget target. Both measures of economic outcomes
were included in the appropriate hypotheses tests.
4.3 Experimental Task and Procedure
The experimental procedures described in this section are modified from Sprinkle
et al. (2008). The business context of the experiment is modified from Chow et al.
(2007). The experiment was conducted using a web-based software program. When
participants entered the experimental site they were seated at individual computers. The
session leader then informed participants that they would be completing several activities
and that the entire experiment would last approximately one hour. Before beginning any
tasks relating to the experiment participants read an instruction page that thanks them for
their participation and also serves as IRB informed consent.
Participants then logged onto their computers and entered the URL address
providing a link to the experimental materials. Upon entering the URL address,
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participants read instructions related to a letter decoding task that was similar to a task
derived from Chow (1983). The purpose of the letter decoding task was not to garner
information related to the dependent variables of interest. Instead, the letter decoding
task enabled participants to earn the right to continue on in the experiment and make
selections between lotteries, rather than being endowed the right to select between
lotteries.32 Prior research has demonstrated that participants make different choices
depending on whether they earn or are endowed with their choice (Hoffman and Spitzer
1985; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith 1994; Boylan and Sprinkle 2001).
In the letter decoding task participants were shown a decoding key that assigns
specific numbers to letters. For example, twenty-six could be assigned to A, and fourteen
to letter B, etc.33 In order to answer a particular problem, individuals had to look up a
particular letter and then enter in the corresponding number. In addition to providing
information on how the letter decoding task works, the instructions also informed
participants they would earn $2 for completing this portion of the experiment.
Additionally, participants were informed that they must decode fifty-five letters in the
main decoding session to earn the right to continue participating in the experiment. They
were also informed they have the opportunity to earn significantly more money in the
latter stages of the experiment. Participants who did not meet the performance
requirement were paid $2 and asked to leave the experiment.

32

Tasks after the letter decoding task require participants select between lotteries. Additionally, the main
experimental task could be viewed as a lottery selection. Therefore, it was important to ensure participants
earned the right to choose between lotteries rather than be endowed with the right to choose between
lotteries.
33
An example letter decoding key is presented in Appendix B.

55

After reading the instructions for the letter decoding task participants performed a
one-minute training session to familiarize themselves with the task. Feedback related to
individual performance was provided following the completion of the one-minute
training session. The feedback contained the correct number of letters decoded as well as
the number of incorrect letters decoded.
Participants then completed one main letter decoding session that lasted for three
minutes. After the main decoding session participants received feedback highlighting the
number of correctly and incorrectly decoded letters to numbers. Once the main letter
decoding session was complete, any participant who did not meet the minimal
performance requirement was paid $2 and asked to leave the experiment.34
Participants were then asked to complete a risk preference task (Holt and Laury
2002) and a loss aversion task (Brink and Rankin 2011). These tasks were included to
capture individuals‟ risk preferences, which indicate individuals‟ propensity for risk,
whereas the loss aversion task captured how individuals react to possible losses. Before
completing the risk preference and loss aversion tasks participants were informed that
they would be compensated based on one randomly selected lottery from each task, thus
placing monetary incentives on their selections of lotteries.
Before participants completed the risk preference and loss aversion tasks they
were asked a question to ensure they understood how they were being compensated for
these two tasks. Participants had five chances to answer this question correctly. After a
fifth attempt to answer the question correctly participants were informed of the correct
34

A similar effort-intensive exercise was used in Sprinkle et al. (2008) and no participants failed to meet
the performance requirement. Decoding fifty-five letters in a three session was not considered to be a
difficult achievement. However, a number of participants failed the letter decoding performance
requirement.
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answer. This provided assurance that participants understood the compensation aspect of
these two tasks. Participants were informed of their earnings from the completion of
these two tasks at the end of the experiment.35
After completing the risk preference and loss aversion tasks participants were
shown an introduction page for the main experimental task. The page informed
participants that they would be compensated based on two randomly selected periods
from the main experimental sessions.36 Participants were also told that their actual
payments based on their selections in the main experimental session would be calculated
based on a conversion of experimental currency (Lira) to U.S. dollars at a rate of 20,000
Lira to $1 U.S. dollar. The average compensation per participant was $24.54 for all
participants and $30.30 for those participants who passed the letter decoding performance
requirement.
Although the main experimental task was modified from Sprinkle et al. (2008) it
was set in the context of the Chow et al. (2007) study. Participants were shown a
narrative describing ABC Company. ABC Company was described as a manufacturing
firm that produces a wide array of products in any given year. Participants were asked to
assume the role of a product manager for ABC Company and were told that as product
manager they are responsible for selecting which product to produce. Participants were
informed that ABC Company has more than one product manager and that all products
they select to manufacture and market are short-term in nature and that each products‟

35

Participants were informed of their compensation from the risk preference and loss aversion tasks at the
end of the experiment so that money earned from these tasks was not included in individuals reference
levels, avoiding any potential impact on individuals decision making in the main experiment task.
36
Participants were not informed of how many periods were in the main experimental task to avoid
strategic decision making and end-game effects.
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duration will be one year. The materials stated that each product manager is allocated
funds each year to select and manufacture one product out of a myriad of options that will
be provided and all products have equivalent costs to manufacture and market.
The background page also contained information relating to the budget target
manipulation. Specifically, participants were told that ABC Company pays its product
managers an annual base salary plus a bonus based on returns above a budget threshold.37
In the easy (moderate) budget target condition, participants were informed that their
annual base salary is 15,000 (30,000) Lira and the budget threshold level was set such
that most (few) alternatives guarantee the attainment of the budget target. Accordingly,
in the easy budget target condition five out of the seven alternatives guarantee the
attainment of the budget target while in the moderate budget target condition only two of
the seven alternatives guarantee the attainment of the budget target.
After reading the description of ABC Company and being informed of the budget
target condition, the materials described how managers are compensated. Participants
were then shown two examples that describe in detail all information relating to the
project information presented. 38,39 The examples presented four pieces of information to
participants: probability of meeting the budget, amount paid if budget is not met, lowest
amount paid if budget is met, and highest amount paid if budget is met. If the budget is
met, participants will be paid an amount between the lowest and highest amount paid if
the budget is met, with each value having an equal probability of selection.
37

In the experimental materials, budget targets were referred to as budget thresholds (Sprinkle et al. 2008).
The term product and project are used interchangeably. Participants saw the term product in the
experiment. The term project is in most cases for ease of reading and interpretation.
39
The product examples followed procedure similar to Sprinkle et al. (2008) who used two demo projects
as examples for participants. Both of the two examples had expected values that were significantly lower
than the projects that are presented in the main experimental sessions. The explanation will explain what
each piece of information represents and how to calculate average payments.
38
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The information that is presented is consistent with prior literature that suggests
managers make risky decisions by taking into account the worst case scenario (not
meeting the budget, amount paid if budget not met), the probability of meeting a target
(probability of meeting budget target), and the best case scenarios (lowest and highest
amounts paid if budget is met) (Shapira 1994). The presentation format is identical to
Sprinkle et al. (2008) and is different from most studies of risky decision making that
generally rely on presenting participants with probability distributions (e.g., Chow et al.
2007).
The information presented in the easy (moderate) budget target condition for the
two example problems was consistent with the manipulations of budget target.
Specifically, the amount paid if the budget is not met was equivalent to the annual base
salary that participants were informed they would receive. The example problems for
both budget target conditions had equivalent expected values. Based on the information
presented in Figure 4, this project has a 65 percent chance of meeting the budget and
therefore has a 35 percent chance of missing the budget. If the budget target is not met
then the manager would be paid his/her annual base salary, 15,000. If, however, the
budget target is attained, then the manager would be paid some amount ranging between
170,000 and 268,462, with each value having an equal probability of occurring.
Therefore, the average pay for attaining the budget, based on Figure 4, would be 219,231.
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Product A – Low Budget Condition
Probability of Meeting the Budget
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met
Lowest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met
Highest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met

65%
15,000
170,000
268,462

FIGURE 4. Example Project Problem

There is a second project example that illustrates the same information using
different parameters. Specifically, the second project example guaranteed the attainment
of the budget target. Once participants were satisfied with the first two example projects,
they were shown two additional example projects that did not include any descriptions
and were asked a number of questions. For each example project there were three
questions. The three questions were: (1) For Product A (B), what is the probability the
budget will not be met? (2) For Product A (B), what amount will the manager earn if the
budget threshold is not met? (3) For Product A (B), what is the expected average payoff
if the budget threshold is met? These questions were designed to ascertain whether
participants understood the project information that was presented and how managers are
compensated based on their project selection.
Once participants answered the understanding questions satisfactorily,40 they were
reminded that they would be compensated based on two randomly selected rounds of the
main experimental task and that they were to assume the role of a product manager.
Additionally, participants were shown their annual base salary and how their budget
target level was set (easy or moderate). Before beginning the actual experimental task,
40

Participants who answered the understanding questions incorrectly the first time were asked to answer
them again. If they did not correctly answer the questions after two attempts the correct answer was
provided. The number of attempts to correctly answer these questions was recorded.
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participants answered a number of questions. They answered a reference level question,
which asked participants, “At what level of payment would you have neither positive nor
negative emotion?” The reference level question was asked prior to the main
experimental task in order to ascertain individuals‟ reference levels that were used in
making the initial period project selection and served as the baseline reference level to
ascertain whether reference levels change over the course of the experiment.
Additionally, participants were asked a question relating to the main experiment
compensation. Specifically, participants were asked, “Of all the product decisions you
will make, how many will be randomly selected and used as a basis for your experimental
compensation?” Participants had five attempts to answer this question correctly. After a
fifth attempt participants were informed of the correct answer. This question provided
assurance that participants understood how they were to be compensated for their
decisions in the main experimental task.
After answering the reference level and compensation question, participants
began the main experiment. During each session the computer program displayed the
same seven projects in varying order, thereby controlling for ordering effects. The seven
projects were designed to simulate a risk-return relationship. Specifically, taking lower
risks generally entails “safer” returns, whereby there is a smaller variance between the
lowest and highest amounts that could be received. Taking higher risks, on the other
hand, generally provides the opportunity for higher returns, yet provides the possibility of
lower returns (Unser 2000; Klos, Weber, and Weber 2005; Rossi and Timmerman 2010).
The simulation of the risk-return relationship was incorporated in the variance of
payments between the lowest and highest amounts paid if the budget is met. As can be
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seen in Figure 5, the variance incorporated in each project increases going from project
one to project seven. For example, the variance for project one was 5,000 while the
variance for project two was 10,000.
In both budget target conditions, the lowest amount paid if the budget is met was
held constant. The highest amount paid if the budget is met, however, varied between
budget target conditions because of a number of differences between the budget target
conditions. One of the differences was the amount of annual base pay. In the easy
budget target condition, the annual base salary was 15,000, which corresponds to the
amount paid if the budget is not met. In the moderate budget target condition, the annual
base salary was 30,000. In order to maintain equivalent expected values between
conditions, the highest amount paid if the budget target is attained was different for all
projects except projects one and two.
Another reason for differences in the highest amount paid was the manipulation of
the probability of meeting the budget target. The probability of meeting the budget target
was also a factor of risk, in addition to the variance of each project. Prior research has
suggested that measures such as variance do not adequately capture risk because
variance, for example in a probability distribution, captures positive returns as well as
negative returns (Unser 2000). Therefore, the probability of meeting the budget was
included as a measure of downside risk, which research suggests is used by managers in
risky decision making (Shapira 1994). The downside risk in this case was the possibility
of missing the budget target. The probability of meeting the budget target was
manipulated for certain projects to simulate differences between moderate and easy
budget targets. For projects one, two, six, and seven, the probability of meeting the
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budget target remained the same in both budget target conditions. In the easy budget
target condition, the probability of meeting the budget for projects three, four, and five
was 100 percent.

Easy Budget Target
Probability of Meeting the Budget
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met
Lowest Amount Paid if the Budget is
Met
Highest Amount Paid if the Budget
is Met
Expected Value
Variance

1
100%
N/A
182,500

2
100%
N/A
180,000

3
100%
N/A
167,500

4
100%
N/A
95,000

5
100%
N/A
80,000

6
60%
15,000
65,000

7
55%
15,000
40,000

187,500

190,000

202,500

275,000

290,000

531,667

608,182

185,000
5,000

185,000
10,000

185,000
35,000

185,000
180,000

185,000
210,000

185,000
466,667

185,000
568,182

Moderate Budget Target
Probability of Meeting the Budget
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met
Lowest Amount Paid if the Budget is
Met
Highest Amount Paid if the Budget
is Met
Expected Value
Variance

1
100%
N/A
182,500

2
100%
N/A
180,000

3
75%
30,000
167,500

4
70%
30,000
95,000

5
65%
30,000
80,000

6
60%
30,000
65,000

7
55%
30,000
40,000

187,500

190,000

305,833

407,857

456,923

511,667

583,636

185,000
5,000

185,000
10,000

185,000
138,333

185,000
312,857

185,000
376,923

185,000
446,667

185,000
543,636

FIGURE 5. Projects to Select from for Easy and Moderate Budget Target Conditions

In the moderate budget target condition, however, the percentages of attaining the
budget target were the same or lower, simulating a more difficult budget target to attain.
For project three, the probability of attaining the budget target was 75 percent in the
moderate budget target condition, compared to 100 percent in the easy budget target
condition. For project 4 the percentage falls to 70 percent (100 percent in easy budget
target condition) and for project five the percentage falls to 65 percent (100 percent in the
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easy budget target condition). The decrease in the percentage chance of attaining the
budget also corresponded to an increase in variance. Thus both indicators of risk
(variance and probability of attaining the budget) increased from project three to project
seven in the moderate budget target condition. The probability of attaining the budget
target was 60 percent and 55 percent respectively for projects 6 and 7.
In the main experimental sessions participants selected which project they wished
to produce, which entailed manufacturing and marketing a product. The variance of the
project selected served as one of the main dependent variables in the study. This
dependent variable identified the level of risk participants were willing to take in their
initial project selection decision. After the first project selection, participants were shown
whether or not they attained the budget target and the economic outcome of their decision
in Lira. Then participants answered questions about their reference level and their
expectations of future economic outcomes for the next period. For future expectations,
participants answered the following question, “What do you think the outcome of your
decision in the next period will be?” Answers to the question relating to reference levels
served as a main dependent variable for hypothesis two. The rest of the main
experimental sessions continued in the same fashion. For each period, the projects
presented were the same. The order in which the projects were presented, however,
varied each period so that no participant saw the same order of projects twice.41
After completing the five experimental periods participants were asked to
complete a post-experimental questionnaire. The post experimental questionnaire
contained a manipulation check question for budget target level and general demographic
41

There were five different orders of projects, one for each period. The sequences of the five specific
orders of projects were also varied between participants.
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questions. In addition to demographic questions, the post experimental questionnaire
asked participants how important it was to meet their budget target. There were also
questions addressing whether participants made their project selection decisions in the
experiment as if they were facing a real world situation. Additional questions ascertained
the degree to which participants‟ decision making was influenced by their budget target
and how important it was for the participant to attain the budget target. Once participants
completed the post-experimental questionnaire they were debriefed, paid, and dismissed.
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5.0 RESULTS

The results section begins with a discussion of the study‟s participants, which
includes information on the participants and identifying those participants excluded from
statistical analysis. I then present descriptive statistics on variables of interest in the
study. The assumptions applicable to the statistical tests used are analyzed, following
which I present the results of the tests of hypotheses. I then conclude this section by
discussing supplemental analysis.
5.1 Analysis of Participant Demographic Information and Responses
Fifty-five individuals participated in the experiment. The participants were
recruited from upper-level accounting courses at a large university in the Southeastern
United States. Due to the nature of the task, upper-level accounting students were
suitable participants. As per Table 5.1 Panel A, there were fifty-five participants who
participated in the experiment. Of the fifty-five participants, twenty-seven participants in
the experiment were in the easy budget target condition and twenty-eight participants
were in the moderate budget target condition.
In the easy budget target condition, four of the twenty-seven individuals failed the
letter-decoding performance requirement. The requirement was to decode fifty-five
letters into numbers during a three minute session. In addition, three individuals in the
easy budget target condition provided irrational answers to the risk preference scale.42
42

The three individuals continually switched decisions between risk-averse and risk-seeking.
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TABLE 5.1. Participant Demographic Statistics
Panel A: Description of Participant Sample
Easy Budget
Moderate Budget
Target
Target

Total

Total Participants

27

28

55

Failed Performance
Requirement

4

8

12

Irrational Risk
Preference Behavior

3

0

3

Participants Used in
Subsequent Analysis
20
20
Panel B: Participant Demographic Statistics
Easy Budget
Moderate Budget
Target
Target
(s.d.)
(s.d.)

40

Total
(s.d.)

Significance
level
(p-value)

Gender

30%

75%

52.5%

3.192
(0.01)a

Age

23.2
(4.086)

23.5
(3.502)

23.35
(3.759)

0.062
(0.80)b

Work Experience

2.5
(3.487)

2.6
(3.912)

2.55
(3.658)

0.007
(0.93)b

a

Tested using Chi-Square analysis. Percentages presented as the percentage of men in each condition.
Significance of Chi-Square value.
b
Tested using univariate comparison of means. Significance of F-Value.

Therefore these three individuals were not included in the analysis as risk preference is an
important control variable. Eight participants in the moderate budget target condition
failed the letter-decoding performance requirement. These exclusions left twenty
observations in the easy budget target condition and twenty observations in the moderate
budget target condition for subsequent statistical analysis.
Panel B of Table 5.1 illustrates that there were no statistically significant
differences of participants in the easy budget target condition and the moderate budget
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target condition regarding age and work experience. There was, however, a statistically
significant difference in gender across conditions (p = 0.01). As can be seen in Table 5.1
Panel B only 30 percent (6 participants) were male in the easy budget target condition
while 75 percent (15 participants) were male in the moderate budget target condition.
Because this variable is different across conditions a dichotomous variable controlling for
gender was included in all hypotheses tests.
Every participant answered a post-experimental questionnaire that asked
numerous questions. All of the questions were answered on a nine-point Likert scale (1 =
Not at all, 9 = Completely). As can be seen in Table 5.2 participants in the easy budget
target condition ( ̅ = 7.25) perceived that their budget target was easier to attain than
individuals in the moderate budget target

̅ = 6.10) and this difference is statistically

significant (p = 0.06). Additionally, the table shows a significant difference (p = 0.08) in
how the budget target impacted participants‟ evaluation of the projects.
Table 5.2 also illustrates that overall participants felt the budget target was
important ( ̅ = 7.93), that the budget target affected project selection ( ̅ = 7.48), that the
experiment was easy to understand ( ̅ = 8.28), and there were not too many projects to
select from ( ̅ = 2.98).
Participants in both budget target conditions perceived that their budget target was
not difficult to attain ( ̅ = 3.35).43 Although participants in the easy budget target
condition had a lower overall response ( ̅ = 3.00) than the moderate budget target
condition ( ̅ = 3.70) there was no statistically significant difference between the budget
target conditions. This could imply that individuals felt the budget target was not
43

All response means were significantly different from the 9-point Likert scale neutral point of four and a
half at p =< 0.01.
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difficult to attain because in both budget target conditions there were projects that
guaranteed the attainment of the budget target. To further examine whether individuals
perceived a difference between budget targets conditions, a composite variable was
created. The composite variable contained responses to “Budget target was easy to
attain” and reverse coded responses to “Budget target was difficult to attain”. As can be
seen in Table 5.2, there is a statistically significant difference between conditions (p =
0.02), which suggests the manipulation of budget target difficulty was successful.

TABLE 5.2. Participants Perceptions Regarding the Experiment
Participant Responses to Post Experimental Questionnaire
Easy
Moderate
Budget Target Budget Target
n = 20
n = 20
(s.d.)
(s.d.)
7.25
6.10
Budget target was easy to attain
(1.65)
(2.15)
Evaluation of alternatives depended
7.40
6.20
upon my budget target
(1.759)
(2.462)
The budget target was important to
8.00
7.85
me
(2.152)
(1.599)
Budget target affected my product
7.25
7.70
selection
(1.773)
(1.525)
3.00
3.70
Budget target was difficult to attain
(1.892)
(2.003)
8.25
8.30
Experiment was easy to understand
(1.251)
(1.302)
There were too many projects to
2.95
3.00
select from
(1.849)
(1.947)
Combination of Easy to Attain and
14.45
12.40
Difficult to Attainb
(2.564)
(2.780)
a

Total
N = 40
(s.d.)
6.68
(1.979)
6.80
(2.198)
7.93
(1.873)
7.48
(1.648)
3.35
(1.955)
8.28
(1.261)
2.98
(1.874)
13.43
(2.836)

p-valuea
0.06
0.08
0.80
0.39
0.26
0.90
0.93
0.02

One-way ANOVAs were conducted for all comparisons between conditions.
This variable is a combination of (1) budget target was easy to attain and the reverse coding of (2) budget
target was difficult to attain.
b
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5.2 Experiment Understanding, Manipulation Check Question, and Compensation
Check Questions
Participants were also asked a number of questions regarding their understanding
of the project information that was presented every period. Figure 6 contains the
questions that were asked to ascertain participants understanding relating to two example
problems.44 Table 5.3 contains the results of these questions. Three of the six questions
were answered correctly by all of the participants. Question three for Product A
pertained to the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met. Thirty-three of
the forty participants (82.5 percent) answered this question correctly on the first attempt
and there was no statistically significant difference between the budget target conditions.
Of the seven (17.5 percent) who missed this question on the first attempt, five (12.5
percent) answered correctly on their second attempt. Only two (5 percent) participants
failed to answer this question correctly in two attempts.

Product A
For Product A, the probability of not meeting the budget is…
For Product A, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is…
For Product A, what is the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met?
Product B
For Product B, the probability of not meeting the budget is…
For Product B, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is…
For Product B, what is the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met?
FIGURE 6. Experiment Understanding Questions

44

Participants answered questions relating to two products, A and B. These products had equal expected
values across budget target conditions. Product A did not guarantee the attainment of the budget target.
Product B did guarantee the attainment of the budget target. The expected value of both Product A and
Product B were lower than the expected values of the projects presented in the main experiment.
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TABLE 5.3. Experimental Task Understanding
Participant Task Understanding Questionsa
Easy Budget Target Moderate Budget Target
Product A Question 1b
100%
100%
c
Product A Question 2
100%
100%
Product A Question 3d
90%
75%
Product B Question 1b
100%
100%
Product B Question 2c
95%
90%
Product B Question 3d
95%
100%

Overall
100%
100%
82.5%
100%
92.5%
97.5%

a

Percentages presented as percent who answered correctly on the first attempt. Participants were given two
attempts to answer correctly. After the second attempt the correct answer was shown
b
Question about the probability of not meeting the budget for example products A and B
c
Question about the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met for example products A and B
d
Question about the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met for example products A and B

For Product B, question two, thirty-seven (92.5 percent) of the participants
answered correctly on the first attempt and the remaining three participants (7.5 percent)
answered correctly on the second attempt. For Product B question three, thirty-nine (97.5
percent) answered correctly on the first attempt and one participant (2.5 percent)
answered correctly on the second attempt. There were no statistically significant
differences between the budget target conditions. These results suggest that participants
had a thorough understanding of the project information that was presented to them. The
two participants (5 percent) who failed to answer the questions correctly were shown the
correct answer before they were allowed to move forward in the experiment.45
Contained in the post experiment questionnaire there was one manipulation check
question to ensure that the experimental manipulation was successful. In addition there
were two compensation related questions asked during the experiment to ensure that
participants understood how they were being compensated for their decisions. Figure 7

45

Results of the hypotheses tests are qualitatively unchanged when they are removed from the statistical
analysis.
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contains the experiment manipulation check question as well as the two compensation
related questions.

Experiment Manipulation Question
Of the seven products presented, how many guaranteed the budget target
would be attained?

Most, Few

Compensation Check Questions
Risk Preference/Loss Aversion
Each task you are about to complete contains ten sets of options. For an
individual task (ten sets of options), how many rows will be randomly
selected for compensation?
Main Experiment
Of all the product selection decisions you will make, how many will be
randomly selected and used as a basis for your experimental
compensation?

1, 2, 3, 5, 7

1, 2, 3, 5,
10

FIGURE 7. Experiment Manipulation Check Question and Compensation Check
Questions

The results of these manipulation checks are presented in Table 5.4. Nineteen of
the twenty participants in the easy budget target condition correctly answered the
experiment manipulation check question. However, only fourteen of the twenty
participants in the moderate budget target condition answered the question correctly. A
Chi-square test to assess whether the percentages of passing/failing were different across
budget target conditions reveals there is a statistically significant difference (2 = 4.329, p
= 0.04). Additional analysis, however, reveals no statistically significant differences in
the reference levels between the participants who passed and failed the manipulation
check (F = 0.892, p = 0.51). There is also no significant difference in product selection
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variance (F = 0.568, p = 0.72).46 The hypotheses tests and sensitivity analysis compares
statistical results with and without those who passed the manipulation check question.
The results for the two compensation related checks are presented in Table 5.4
Panels B and C. In these questions participants were given as many attempts as
necessary to answer the questions correctly and the experiment program tracked the
number of attempts per participant. As can be seen in Panel B Table 5.4, twenty (50
percent) of the participants correctly answered the risk preference/loss aversion
compensation question correctly on the first attempt. In total, twenty-nine (72.5 percent)
of the participants answered this question correctly in the first two attempts. One
participant (2.5 percent) took three attempts, five participants (12.5 percent) took four
attempts, four participants (10 percent) took five attempts, and one participant (2.5
percent) took six attempts. There are no statistically significant differences between the
budget target conditions (2 = 5.711, p = 0.34) in the number of attempts for the risk
preference/loss aversion question. There is also no significant difference in the risk
preference measure based on the number of attempts to answer this question correctly (F
= 0.495, p = 0.49). However, there is a statistically significant difference in the loss
aversion measure based on whether a participant answered this question correctly on the
first attempt or not (F = 4.179, p = 0.05). 47

46

Both tests were conducted using MANOVA due to the correlation between the reference levels and the
correlation between the product selection variances. Results of a univariate analysis are qualitatively the
same.
47
For both of these tests the independent variable was a dichotomous variable equal to one if a participant
answered correctly on the first attempt and equal to zero if not answered correctly on the first attempt. This
increases the power of the statistical tests.
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TABLE 5.4. Experiment Manipulation Check Question and Compensation Check
Questions
Panel A: Manipulation Check Question
Easy Budget Target Moderate Budget Target Overall
19
14
33b
Experiment
Pass
(95%)
(70%)
(82.5%)
Manipulation
1
6
7b
Checka
Fail
(5%)
(30%)
(17.5%)
Panel B: Risk Preference and Loss Aversion Compensation Question
Easy Budget Target Moderate Budget Target Overall
8
12
20
1
(40%)
(60%)
(50%)
5
4
9
2
(25%)
(20%)
(22.5%)
Risk Preference
0
1
1
and Loss
3
(0%)
(5%)
(2.5%)
Aversion
Compensation
4
1
5
4
Question:
(20%)
(5%)
(12.5%)
Number of
3
1
4
5
Attemptsc
(15%)
(5%)
(10%)
0
1
1
6
(0%)
(5%)
(2.5%)
Total
20
20
40
Panel C: Main Experiment Compensation Question
Easy Budget Target Moderate Budget Target Overall
10
14
24
1
(50%)
(70%)
(60%)
7
4
11
2
Main Experiment
(35%)
(20%)
(27.5%)
Compensation
1
0
1
3
Question:
(5%)
(0%)
(2.5%)
Number of
1
1
2
4
Attemptsd
(5%)
(5%)
(5%)
1
1
2
5
(5%)
(5%)
(5%)
Total
20
20
40
a

Of the seven products presented, how many guaranteed the budget target would be attained?
Chi-Square test suggests a significant difference between the easy budget target condition and moderate
budget target condition (2 = 4.329, p = 0.04). Two cells in this analysis, however, have expected values
less than five which could bias the Chi-Square value. This variable was controlled for in statistical
analysis.
c
Each task you are about to complete contains ten sets of options. For an individual task (ten sets of
options), how many rows will be randomly selected for compensation?
d
Of all the product decisions you will make, how many will be randomly selected and used as a basis for
your experimental compensation?
b
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The data for the main experiment compensation question, which can be seen in
Table 5.4 Panel C, reveals that twenty-four (60 percent) participants correctly answered
this question on the first attempt. An additional eleven (27.5 percent) answered this
question correctly on their second attempt. Therefore, thirty-five (87.5 percent)
participants answered this question correctly in the first two attempts. One participant
(2.5 percent) took three attempts, two participants (5 percent) took four attempts and two
more participants (5 percent) took five attempts to answer this question correctly.
Multiple tests were conducted to ascertain whether individuals who answered this
question correctly on the first attempt provided significantly different answers for the
dependent variables than individuals who did not answer this question correctly on the
first attempt.48 The results suggest that there is no statistically significant difference
between the two groups for product selection variance (F = 1.226, p = 0.32) or reference
levels (F = 0.492, p = 0.81).49
5.3 Descriptive Statistics Regarding Dependent Variables and Control Variables of
Interest
There were a number of control variables that were captured during the
experiment. Participants provided their choices on a risk preference and loss aversion
scale. Table 5.5 contains the descriptive statistics for these two control variables. The

48

The independent variable in the tests was a dichotomous variable equal to one if an individual passed on
the first attempt and zero if they did not pass on the first attempt. Using all levels of the number of
attempts creates power issues in the statistical tests and highly unbalanced cell sizes. The results are
qualitatively the same.
49
Both tested using a MANOVA due to the correlations in projects selected between periods. Results of a
univariate analysis are qualitatively the same. The overall omnibus test is statistically insignificant.
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table illustrates that there are no statistically significant differences between the budget
target conditions for either risk preference or loss aversion.50,51

TABLE 5.5. Risk Preference and Loss Aversion Statistics
Risk Preference and Loss Aversion by Budget Target Condition
Easy Budget
Moderate
Target
Budget Target
n = 20
n = 20
(s.d.)
(s.d.)
3.75
3.50
Risk Preference
(2.124)
(1.933)
3.20
2.65
Loss Aversion
(3.037)
(2.254)

Total
N = 40
(s.d.)

p-value

3.63
(2.009)
2.92
(2.654)

0.70
0.52

There were two main dependent variables used in the statistical analysis,
reference levels and product selection variance. Reference levels were measured using
the following question: “At what level of payment would you have neither positive nor
negative emotion?” Participants answered this question before beginning the main
experiment and every period after they had received information regarding the economic
outcomes of the period before. Therefore, there are six reference level measures. The
descriptive statistics for reference levels based on budget target condition and by period
are presented in Table 5.6.

50

The risk preference measure is on a 10-point scale, with higher scores indicating a risk-seeking attitude
and lower scores indicating a risk-averse attitude. A score of five would indicate risk neutrality. All values
presented are significantly different than the mid-point of five by p <=0.05.
51
The loss aversion measure is a 10-point scale with higher scores indicating greater loss aversion and
lower scores indicating lower loss aversion. A score of five is the mid-point. All values presented are
significantly different than the mid-point of five by p <=0.05.
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TABLE 5.6. Descriptive Statistics for Reference Level
Reference Level by Period and Budget Target Condition
Reference Level
Easy Budget Target
Moderate Budget
Period
(s.d.)
Target (s.d.)
54,250.00
37,000.00
0
(68,906.40)
(28,672.38)

Total
(s.d.)
45,625.00
(52,820.30)

p-value
0.31

1

131,581.00
(94,812.21)

78,750.00
(68,784.08)

105,165.50
(86,023.65)

0.05

2

124,375.00
(68,594.32)

76,000
(67,621.24)

100,187.50
(71,554.15)

0.03

3

127,850.00
(65,749.35)

77,000
(64,571.46)

102,425.00
(69,284.58)

0.01

4

129,125.00
(75,877.65)

80,750.00
(63,126.34)

104,937.50
(73,118.47)

0.03

5

140,500.00
(88,732.30)

108,250.00
(82,130.75)

124,375.00
(85,957.56)

0.24

Total

117,946.83
(81,573.59)

76,291.67
(66,568.02)

97,119.25
(77,169.86)

0.00

Table 5.6 shows that individuals in the easy budget target condition had a higher
baseline reference level ( ̅ = 54,250.00) than in the moderate budget target condition ( ̅ =
37,000.00). The difference is not statistically significant but is unexpected. Before a task
has begun, an individual should have no expectations of future economic outcomes.
When there are no expectations, an individual‟s reference level should theoretically be
based on exogenous factors, such as contract parameters. In this case, individuals in the
easy budget target condition should have reference levels around 15,000 and individuals
in the moderate budget target condition should have reference levels around 30,000.
In the easy budget target condition, eleven out of twenty participants (55 percent)
reported a reference level of 15,000. Four (20 percent) reported a reference level of
100,000. In the moderate budget target condition, fourteen out of twenty participants (70
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percent) reported an initial reference level of 30,000. Three participants (15 percent)
reported a reference level of 100,000. It could be that after individuals were informed of
their compensation contracts, they began to formulate expectations. Specifically, in the
easy budget target condition, participants were informed that their budget target had been
set so that a majority of the projects presented allowed them to attain their budget target
with certainty. Therefore, individuals could have impounded this information into their
expectations, which could be reflected in the slightly higher baseline reference level for
those in the easy budget target condition.
Table 5.6 also shows there are significant univariate differences between easy and
moderate budget target conditions for periods one, two, three, and four, as well as
significant differences in the overall means between the easy and moderate budget target
conditions.52 Although there are no hypotheses relating to reference level and budget
target condition, it is interesting to see how reference levels shifted over time based on
budget target condition. Figure 8 suggests the largest change in reference level occurs
from the initial reference level (before the main experiment) and period1. After period 1
the reference levels of participants appears to flatten out from period 1 to period 5. This
pattern suggests that participants adjust their expectations after the conclusion of the first
period, and any adjustments after the first period were of much smaller magnitude on
average.

52

In period zero, the expectation is that a majority of participants would have a reference level equal to the
base annual salary. In the easy budget target condition, eleven out of twenty participants reported a
reference level of 15,000. Four reported a reference level of 100,000. In the moderate budget target
condition, fourteen out of twenty participants reported an initial reference level of 30,000. Three
participants reported a reference level of 100,000.
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FIGURE 8. Mean Reference Level over Time

Table 5.7 presents descriptive statistics with regards to project selection variance.
Panel A of Table 5.7 presents information relating to the actual projects selected, by
budget target condition. Overall, the total row suggests that individuals selected different
products depending on which budget target condition they were in. Specifically, there
are pronounced differences with respect to projects B, D, E, and F. The data for project
B, which is a low risk project, illustrates that fewer participants selected this project in
the easy budget target condition than in the moderate budget target condition.
Participants in the moderate budget target condition appear to select project D more often
than participants in the easy budget target condition. For products E and F, which are
both higher risk projects, participants in the easy budget target condition appear more
likely to select these projects than participants in the moderate budget target condition.
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TABLE 5.7. Descriptive Statistics for Project Selection
Panel A: Project Selection by Budget Condition and Period
Project Selected
Period Condition
A
B
C
D
E
Easy
6
2
6
1
1
1
Moderate
7
7
2
3
0
2

3

4

5

Total

F
3

G
1

Total
20

0

1

20

Easy

2

4

4

1

4

4

1

20

Moderate

6

6

4

2

1

1

0

20

Easy

5

3

5

2

2

2

1

20

Moderate

5

7

3

3

1

1

0

20

Easy

3

4

4

2

2

5

0

20

Moderate

2

5

4

5

2

0

2

20

Easy

7

3

4

1

2

2

1

20

Moderate

5

6

5

2

1

1

0

20

Easy

23

16

23

7

11

16

4

100

Moderate

25
31
18
15
5
3
3
100
Panel B: Project Selection Variance by Period and Budget Target Condition
Project Selection Variance
Easy Budget Target
Moderate Budget
Total
Period
(s.d.)
Target (s.d.)
(s.d.)
p-value
130,909.15
93,193.65
111,551.40
1
0.510
(194,343.83)
(154,685.51)
(173,403.00)
2

182,242.50
(197,863.13)

104,631.80
(144,309.45)

143,437.15
(175,394.06)

0.165

3

125,575.80
(178,082.08)

113,608.00
(151,365.43)

122,913.33
(165,836.11)

0.728

4

165,416.75
(191,944.54)

200,936.75
(182,699.37)

182,676.75
(185,076.61)

0.540

5

115,325.80
(180,403.23)

111,298.45
(142,533.39)

113.312.13
(142,533.39)

0.938

Total

143,894.00
(186,609.14)

124,733.70
(157,506.60)

134,313.90
(172,505.30)

0.217
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Panel B presents information relating to the variances of the products selected.
The univariate statistics suggest that there is no statistically significant difference
between any of the periods or in total for product selection variance. Product selection
variance, however, is not consistent across budget target conditions. In order to maintain
equal expected values, the variances of the projects presented in the easy budget target
differed from those in the moderate budget target (see Figure 4.2). The descriptive
statistics presented in Table 5.7 Panel B illustrate that on average participants in the easy
budget target condition selected projects with higher project variances in the first period
( ̅ = 130,909.15) than participants in the moderate budget target condition ( ̅ =
93,193.65). These descriptive statistics provide preliminary evidence that participants in
the easy budget target condition were willing to take more risk in their project selection
than participants in the moderate budget target condition.
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FIGURE 9. Mean Project Selection Variance over Time
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Period 5

5.4 Assumption Testing
5.4.1 Assumptions for Hypothesis One and Two
Hypothesis one and two are tested using linear regression. This section presents
the analysis of linear regression assumptions. There are four basic assumptions of linear
regression: (1) the mean probability distribution of the error term is zero, (2) the error
term has constant variance for all levels of the independent variables, (3) the probability
distribution of the error term is normal, and (4) the error terms are independent.
The first assumption was examined by plotting the residuals versus the
independent variable, budget condition. The dependent variable in hypothesis one is
product selection variance in the first period. There were no patterns observed in the data
and the pattern of residuals did not appear to be systematically different between the two
budget conditions. Therefore the first assumption is satisfied for hypothesis one.
For hypothesis two, the dependent variable is the change in reference level from
period zero to period five. To assess the probability distribution of the error term, a
scatterplot of the residuals versus the independent variable, number of times the budget
target was attained, was examined. The scatterplot revealed no patterns in the data and
the pattern of residuals did not appear to be systematically different. Therefore, the
assumption of a mean of zero for the error term is satisfied.
The next assumption is that the error term has a constant variance for all levels of
the independent variable. To examine this assumption for both hypothesis one and two a
scatterplot of the residuals versus the predicted dependent variable values was created.
For both hypothesis one and two, there appeared to be no patterns which would indicate
unequal variance detected in the scatterplot. To further test the assumption of constant
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variance a Levene‟s test was conducted. For both hypothesis one and two, the Levene‟s
test revealed the assumption of constant variance was satisfied (p>0.30).
The third assumption examined was whether the error term was normally
distributed. For both hypothesis one and two a histogram of the residuals was examined.
The histogram for hypothesis one reveals a violation of this assumption. Specifically the
distribution is skewed to the left. Regression, however, is robust to violations of this
assumption (Jahan and Khan 2012). Hypothesis one is tested using equal cell sizes.
Therefore, even though the assumption of a normally distributed error term is violated for
hypothesis one, I will rely on the robustness of regression.53 The normality assumption
for hypothesis two appears to be satisfied from examining the histogram of residuals as
the distribution of the error term appears to be normal.
The last assumption relates to the independence of the error terms. For hypothesis
one, this data is not dependent on time and therefore residual correlation is highly
unlikely. The independence of error terms for hypothesis two is more likely, given that
the dependent variable, change in reference level, is a change score. The Durbin-Watson
statistic, however, reveals there is little to no autocorrelation in the error terms (2.111). A
Durbin-Watson score of 2.00 indicates no autocorrelation.
5.4.2 Assumptions for Hypothesis Three
Hypothesis three is tested using independent one-sample t-tests. Before running
the t-tests an analysis was conducted to determine whether there were any significant
covariates that must be accounted for. The analysis, which is fully discussed later in this
section, revealed that there were no covariates that were significantly correlated with the
53

A non-parametric Mann-Whitley test was conducted as additional analysis of hypothesis one. The results
for hypothesis one are qualitatively the same.
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dependent variable, the change in product selection variance. Therefore, independent
one-sample t-tests were conducted.
There are a number of assumptions of independent small-sample t-tests. The
samples being compared should follow a normal distribution, have constant variance, and
the observations should be independent. To assess the normal distribution of the
dependent variable change in product selection, a Shapiro-Wilks test was performed. The
results of this test reveal that the dependent variable for hypothesis three is non-normal.
Therefore, the other assumptions mentioned previously were not analyzed and hypothesis
three was tested using a Wilcoxon signed rank test, a non-parametric test.
5.5 Test of Hypotheses
5.5.1 Test of Hypothesis One
Hypothesis one predicts that participants in the easy budget target condition will
exhibit more risk taking in the first period than participants in the moderate budget target
condition. A regression analysis was conducted to test this hypothesis. Table 5.8
presents the results of the regression analysis. Models one and two are run with the entire
sample (N = 40) while models three and four are run with only those participants who
passed the experiment manipulation check (N = 33). As can be seen, no models are
significant in the analysis. Additionally, the coefficient for budget target condition is not
significant. Therefore, this test does not provide support for hypothesis one.54

54

One-sample independent t-test have qualitatively similar results, t = 0.679, p = 0.25. Additionally, nonparametric tests for differences also have qualitatively similar results, p = 0.16.
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TABLE 5.8. Regression Analysis for Hypothesis One
Regression Models of Project Selection Variance:
Period 1a
Project Selection Variancet=1 = 0 + 1Budget Target Condition + 2Risk Preference
+ 3Loss Aversion + 4Baseline Reference Level + 5Gender + 


Variable

Predicted
Sign

Model
Intercept
Independent Variable
(H1)
Budget Target
Conditiond
Control Variables

-

Risk Preferencee

+

Loss Aversionf
Baseline Reference
Levelg
Genderh

-

Adjusted R2
Sample Size

1b
1.631
(0.188)
0.107

2b
1.569
(0.195)
0.199

3c
1.141
(0.358)
0.262

4c
1.216
(0.329)
0.427

-0.420

0.227

-0.402

0.307

1.412*

1.458*

1.960**
-0.282
1.064

2.053**
-0.381
1.423

-0.497
1.064

-0.645
1.472

-1.127
0.061
40

0.068
40

-1.201
0.017
33

0.033
33

*, **, *** One-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, for predicted effects.
a
Project Selection Variance: The variance associated with the project that participants selected in period 1.
A Tobit regression was run and the results are qualitatively the same.
b
Full sample of observations.
c
Sample includes only those who passed the experiment manipulation check.
d
Budget Target Condition: Coded as zero for participants in the easy budget target condition and one for
those in the moderate budget target condition.
e
Risk Preference: Based on the Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference scale. Values range from zero to
ten. Higher scores indicate more risk-seeking, lower scores indicate more risk-aversion.
f
Loss Aversion: Based on the Brink and Rankin (2011) loss aversion scale. Values range from zero to ten.
Higher scores indicate more loss aversion. Lower scores indicate less loss aversion.
g
Baseline Reference Level: The response to the following statement: “At what level of payment would you
have neither positive nor negative emotion?” The baseline reference level was ascertained before the first
period of the main experiment.
h
Gender: Coded as 0 for females and 1 for males.
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Due to the small sample size of the experiment and the differences in product
selection variance between the budget target conditions, further analysis of hypothesis
one is warranted. Referring back to Table 5.7, there was a sizeable difference in the
product selection variance between the easy ( ̅ = 130,909.15) and moderate ( ̅ =
93,193.65) budget target conditions. However, the standard deviations relating to the
means of easy and moderate budget target condition are both larger than the means,
suggesting large variation in the data, which could impact the statistical tests.
Therefore, a qualitative analysis of the frequency of the projects selected by
budget target condition was conducted. Table 5.9 reports the results of a number of ChiSquare frequency tests to assess whether the proportion of products selected is different
between the easy and moderate budget target conditions. Table 5.9 presents frequency
tables and Chi-square analysis for hypothesis one.
Panel A of Table 5.9 presents the results of a Chi-square analysis analyzing each
project as a separate category. The overall Chi-Square is not significant (2 = 9.855, p =
0.13) and the Gamma correlational coefficient (t = -1.283, p = 0.20) is also not
significant.55 This analysis, however, is performed where twelve of the fourteen cells
(85.7 percent) have expected values less than five, and the minimum count is 0.50. To
alleviate some of the expected count concerns, Panel B of Table 5.9 presents a two-bytwo classification.

55

The gamma statistic is preferred over Spearman‟s Rho and Cramer‟s V when working with collapsed
ordinal data that have a limited number of categories and when data have many tied observations (SAS
1999). Gamma is designed to determine how effectively information about an individual‟s ranking in one
variable is at predicting that individuals ranking in the other variable. The gamma statistic computes the
level of association between two variables.
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TABLE 5.9. Full Sample Frequency Distribution and Chi-Square Analysisa
Panel A: All Projects Included as Categoriesb
Easy
Moderate
Chi-Square
Budget
Budget
Value
Gamma
Project
Target
Target
Total (significance)c (significance)d
A
6
7
13
B
2
7
9
C
6
2
8
9.855
-0.274
D
1
3
4
(0.13)
(0.20)
E
1
0
1
F
3
0
3
G
1
1
2
Panel B: Projects Split into Two Categories (A, B, C) and (E, F, G)e
Easy
Moderate
Chi-Square
Budget
Budget
Value
Gamma
c
Category
Target
Target
Total (significance) (significance)d
Less Risk
14
16
30
(A, B, C)
2.697
-0.702
More Risk
(0.11)
(0.08)
5
1
6
(E, F, G)
Panel C: Projects Split into Three Categories (A, B), (C, D, E) and (F, G)f
Easy
Moderate
Chi-Square
Budget
Budget
Value
Gamma
c
Category
Target
Target
Total (significance) (significance)d
Low Risk
8
14
22
(A, B)
Moderate Risk
4.129
-0.541
8
5
13
(C, D, E)
(0.13)
(0.03)
High Risk
4
1
5
(F, G)
*, **, ***

Two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
One-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a
Analysis with only those who passed the manipulation check are generally the same. Results for Panel
B become insignificant at p = 0.14. This is most likely due to the decreased sample size and less
statistical power. Results for Panel C are similar ( = -1.847, 0.06).
b
85.7% of the products contain expected counts less than five. The minimum count is 0.50.
c
Chi-Square value is two-tailed and cannot be divided because the distribution is not symmetric.
d
A correlational coefficient related to a directional prediction and is presented as a one-tailed significance
level. Tests the correlation between budget target condition and project risk selection. The approximate
T-statistic is not reported in the table.
e
To get an approximate Chi-Square, created a 2 X 2 frequency table. Classified projects A, B, and C as
less risk and projects E, F, G as more risk. Enables a Fischer‟s Exact test. The significance of the ChiSquare is the Fischer‟s exact test statistic.
f
Created smaller groups to alleviate some issues with expected counts. Classified projects A and B as
low risk, projects C, D, and E as moderate risk, and projects F and G as high risk. Only 33.3% of the
cells had expected counts less than five. The minimum count is 2.5.
+, ++, +++
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A two-by-two classification allows for a Fischer‟s Chi-square exact test, which
does not take into account expected cell counts. The classifications divided projects into
two groups, less risk and more risk. Projects A, B, and C were classified as less risk
while projects E, F, and G were classified as more risk. The Chi-square is not significant
(2 = 2.697, p = 0.11) but the Gamma correlational coefficient is marginally significant (t
= -1.760, p = 0.08). The Gamma correlational coefficient measures the correlation
between the two variables in a contingency table. In Panel B of Table 5.9, the negative
Gamma indicates that more risky projects are more likely to be selected by participants in
the easy budget target condition, rather than the moderate budget target condition.
Panel C of Table 5.9 presents a split of the projects that incorporates all of the
available projects. Projects A and B are classified as low risk, projects C, D, and E are
classified as moderate risk, and projects F and G are classified as high risk. The overall
Chi-square is not significant (2 = 4.129, p = 0.13) but the Gamma correlational
coefficient is statistically significant (t = -2.172, p = 0.03). This again suggests that as
project risk increases, participants in the easy budget target are more likely to select
higher risk projects than participants in the moderate budget target condition. The results
of Panel B and Panel C of Table 5.9 both provide partial support for hypothesis one.56
Given the results of the regression analysis, combined with the evidence presented
in Table 5.9, there is mixed support for hypothesis one. The regression results, reported
using a quantitative dependent variable, project selection variance, revealed no
statistically significant differences between easy and moderate budget target conditions.
This test followed prior literature that relied on project variance as a measure of risk (e.g.,
56

The classifications of projects presented are the most logical classifications. Classifying projects based
on other specifications generally provide qualitatively similar results.
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Chow et al. 2007). The Chi-square analysis suggests that participants in the easy budget
target condition are more likely to select a more risky project than participants in the
moderate budget target condition, consistent with SP|A predictions. This analysis is
similar to what was conducted by Sprinkle et al. (2008), who created classifications of the
projects presented to compare projects selected by participants. Based on the above
analysis, there is mixed support for hypothesis one.
5.5.2 Test of Hypothesis Two
Hypothesis two predicts that participants who continually attain their budget
target will exhibit a greater change in their reference level than those who do not
continually attain their budget target. To test this hypothesis a regression analysis was
conducted. The bivariate correlations for the variables included in the model are
presented in Table 5.10.
The independent variable, attained budget target, is significantly correlated with
the dependent variable, change in reference level. Additionally, the covariates loss
aversion and gender are also significantly correlated with the dependent variable.
Although risk preference and attained budget target period 4 and period 5 are not
correlated with the dependent variable, they are left in the model because they were
predicted to affect the level of reference level change. As shown in Table 5.10, there are
no concerns for multicollinearity. None of the independent variables are highly
correlated with other independent variables above. Specifically, the highest correlation
between the independent variable, attained budget target, and a control variable, attained
budget target in period five is 0.41 (p = 0.02).
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TABLE 5.10. Bivariate Correlations for Hypothesis Two
Bivariate Correlations for Variables in the Regression Models of Change in Reference Level*
Change in
Attained
Risk
Loss
Attained Budget Attained Budget
Variable
Reference Level Budget Target Preference Aversion Target Period 4 Target Period 5
0.36
0.03
-0.26
0.05
0.15
Change in Reference Levela
1.00
(0.04)
(0.87)
(0.14)
(0.79)
(0.39)
0.38
-0.07
0.09
0.37
0.38
b
Times Attained Budget Target
1.00
(0.03)
(0.71)
(0.61)
(0.04)
(0.03)
0.01
0.01
-0.15
0.25
-0.02
Risk Preferencec
1.00
(0.96)
(0.96)
(0.40)
(0.16)
(0.91)
-0.46
-0.08
0.08
0.14
-0.05
Loss Aversiond
1.00
(0.01)
(0.66)
(0.67)
(0.44)
(0.77)
Attained Budget Target Period
0.04
0.36
0.30
0.16
-0.08
1.00
4e
(0.82)
(0.04)
(0.09)
(0.36)
(0.66)
0.16
0.41
0.02
-0.18
-0.08
Attained Budget Target Period 5f
1.00
(0.38)
(0.02)
(0.93)
(0.33)
(0.66)
-0.31
-0.284
0.05
0.06
-0.246
-0.01
Genderg
(0.08)
(0.11)
(0.78)
(0.73)
(0.17)
(0.60)
*

Gender
-0.33
(0.06)
-0.33
(0.07)
0.10
(0.59)
-0.13
(0.47)
-0.25
(0.17)
-0.10
(0.60)
1.00

Pearson correlation statistics are reported above the diagonal and nonparametric Spearman correlation statistics are reported below the diagonal. Two-tailed p-values are in the
parentheses.
a
Change in Reference Level: The response to the following statement: “At what level of payment would you have neither positive nor negative emotion?” This question was
answered before the first period of the main experiment and every period thereafter, up to period 5. Change in Reference Level in this table is the difference in responses to the
aforementioned question between period 5 and period 0.
b
Times Attained Budget Target: A count variable that counts the number of times an individual attained the budget target up to period 5. Values range as follows (number of
participants): three (four), four (eight), and five (twenty-one).
c
Risk Preference: Based on the Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference scale. Values range from zero to ten. Higher scores indicate more risk-seeking, lower scores indicate
more risk-aversion.
d
Loss Aversion: Based on the Brink and Rankin (2011) loss aversion scale. Values range from zero to ten. Higher scores indicate more loss aversion. Lower scores indicate less
loss aversion.
e
Attained Budget Target Period 4: Coded as 0 if the participant missed the budget target in period four and 1 if the participant attained the budget target in period four.
f
Attained Budget Target Period 5: Coded as 0 if the participant missed the budget target in period five and 1 if the participant attained the budget target in period five.
g
Gender: Coded as 0 for females and 1 for males.
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The means for change in reference level from period zero to period five are
presented in Table 5.11. The means are presented based on the number of times a
participant attained the budget target. As expected, participants who attained the budget
target three times show a mean change in reference level of 17,500 while participants
who attained the budget target four times show a mean change of 21,125. Both of these
amount appear to be significantly lower than the mean change of 93,333.33 for
participants who attained the budget target in every period. There is a moderately
significant difference between the three groups (F = 2.601, p = 0.09).

TABLE 5.11. Change in Reference Level by Number of Times the Budget Target was
Attained
Change in Reference Level
Number of Times Attained
Three
Four
Five
Total
(s.d.)
(s.d.)
(s.d.)
(s.d.)
[n]
[n]
[n]
[n]
p - value
17,500
21,125.00
93,333.33
67,121.21
Mean (88,835.05)
(45,272.00)
(97,805.08)
(91,702.90)
0.09
[4]
[8]
[21]
[33]

The regression models for hypothesis two are presented in Table 5.12. In all four
models, the coefficient on Times Attained Budget Target is positive and statistically
significant (one-tailed p < 0.05).57 The positive, significant coefficient indicates that the
more times a participant attains the budget target, the greater the change in their reference
level. This suggests the more times an individual attains the budget target, the greater

57

Results for hypothesis two are qualitatively similar when Times Attained Budget Target is coded as a
dichotomous variable. Variable coded as one for those who attained the budget target every period and
zero for those who missed the budget target at least once.
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their expectations of future economic outcomes. This relationship remains when Gender
is added into the model. Therefore, Table 5.12 provides support for hypothesis two.58
Additional analysis in models three and four analyze whether there is a recency
effect whereby individuals take into account whether they have attained the budget target
in the two most recent periods and whether there is an impact on the change in reference
level. Although this effect is not hypothesized, the analysis was conducted to ensure the
change in reference level was not caused by the most recent period‟s outcome. As can be
seen in Table 5.12 there does not appear to be a recency effect. Overall, the results
reported provide support for hypothesis two.59
5.5.3 Test of Hypothesis Three
Hypothesis three predicts that participants who continually attain the budget target
will exhibit less risking taking after multiple periods than they did in the initial period.
This prediction is based on SP|A theory, in which increases in a participant‟s reference
level would suggest that fewer risky projects allow for the attainment of their aspiration
level. Therefore, in order to guarantee the attainment of the aspiration level, participants
will have to select from less risky projects.

58

Additional analysis identified two outliers in the sample. The results for hypothesis two are qualitatively
the same without these observations included in the sample. Results are presented with the observations
kept in the sample.
59
Results for hypothesis two are qualitatively similar when the quantitative economic outcomes from
period four and period five are used in place of the dichotomous variables attained budget target period four
and period five.
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TABLE 5.12. Regression Analysis for Hypothesis Two
Regression Models of Change in Reference Level:
Period 5 compared to Period 0a
Change in Reference Level = 0 + 1Times Attained Budget Target + 2Risk
Preference
+ 3Loss Aversion + 4Attained Budget Target in Period 4
+ 5 Attained Budget Target in Period 5 + 6 Gender + 

Variable
Modelb
(Significance)c
Intercept
Independent Variable
(H2)
Times Attained Budget
Targetd
Control Variables
Risk Preference
Loss Aversion
Attained Budget
Target- P4
Attained Budget
Target- P5
Gender
Adjusted R2
Sample Size

Predicted
Sign

+

1
2.656
(0.067)
-1.236

2
2.759
(0.047)
-0.483

3
1.526
(0.215)
-1.105

4
1.817
(0.135)
-0.313

2.336***

1.771**

2.060**

1.743**

0.060
-1.766+

0.170
-1.960+

0.187
-1.630

0.388
-1.791+

-0.081

-0.682

-0.031

-0.204
-1.664

0.076
33

0.133
33

-1.620
0.134
33

0.18
33

*, **, *** One-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, for predicted effects.
+ ++ +++
, ,
Two-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a
Change in Reference Level: The response to the following statement: “At what level of payment would
you have neither positive nor negative emotion?” This question was answered before the first period of
the main experiment began and every period thereafter, up to period 5. Change in Reference Level in this
table is the difference in responses to the aforementioned question between period 5 and period 0.
b
Sample includes only those who passed the experiment manipulation check. Results are qualitatively
different for the entire sample. Those who passed the manipulation check had significantly different
values for change in reference level than those who did not pass the manipulation check (F = 3.097, p =
0.09). Therefore, this analysis only includes those who passed the manipulation check question.
c
P-value relating to the significance of the model.
d
Times Attained Budget Target: Count variable equal to the number of times an individual has attained
the budget target up to period 5. Values range as follows (number of participants): three (four), four
(eight) and five (twenty-one).
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Before testing this hypothesis, an analysis of a priori control variables is
performed. Specifically, I analyze whether any control variables are significantly
correlated with the dependent variable. The correlations are presented in Table 5.13.
The correlation table reveals that none of the a priori covariates are significantly
correlated with the dependent variable change in project selection. Economic outcome
period 4 is not significantly correlated based on Pearson correlation, but is based on the
Spearman correlation. For this variable, which is continuous, the Pearson correlation is a
more appropriate correlation to analyze. Based on the correlation table, the test for
hypothesis three will be a series of one-sample t-tests assessing whether the change in
project selection variance is different than zero in the negative direction.
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TABLE 5.13. Bivariate Correlations for Hypothesis Three
Bivariate Correlations for Variables in the Regression Models of
Change in Project Selection*
Variable
Change in Project Selection
Variancea

Change in
Project Selection
Variance
1

Risk
Preference
0.113
(0.60)

Loss
Aversion
-0.57
(0.79)
-0.287
(0.17)

Reference Level
Period 4
-0.122
(0.57)
0.108
(0.62)
-0.141
(0.51)

Future
Expectation
Period 4
-0.207
(0.33)
0.159
(0.46)
-0.188
(0.38)
0.377
(0.07)

Economic
Outcome Period 4
-0.333
(0.11)
-0.225
(0.29)
-0.197
(0.36)
-0.101
(0.64)
-0.125
(0.56)

Gender
0.204
(0.34)
-0.061
(0.78)
-0.154
(0.47)
-0.314
(0.14)
-0.069
(0.75)
0.134
(0.53)

-0.061
1
(0.78)
0.106
-0.130
Loss Aversionc
1
(0.62)
(0.55)
-0.198
0.105
-0.183
Reference Level Period 4d
1
(0.35)
(0.62)
(0.39)
Future Expectations Period
0.105
0.448
-0.150
0.281
1
4e
(0.63)
(0.03)
(0.48)
(0.18)
Economic Outcome Period
-0.378
-0.207
-0.122
-0.182
-0.148
1
4f
(0.07)
(0.33)
(0.57)
(0.39)
(0.49)
0.223
-0.087
-0.141
-0.310
-0.025
-0.151
Genderg
1
(0.30)
(0.69)
(0.51)
(0.14)
(0.91)
(0.48)
*
Pearson correlation statistics are reported above the diagonal and nonparametric Spearman correlation statistics are reported below the diagonal.
Two-tailed p-values are in the parentheses.
a
Change in Product Selection Variance: Difference in project selection variance from period five to period one.
b
Risk Preference: Based on the Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference scale. Values range from zero to ten. Higher scores indicate more risk-seeking,
lower scores indicate more risk-aversion.
c
Loss Aversion: Based on the Brink and Rankin (2011) loss aversion scale. Values range from zero to ten. Higher scores indicate more loss aversion.
Lower scores indicate less loss aversion.
d
Reference Level Period 4: The reference level reported after period four. Answer to the question: “At what level of payment would you have neither
positive nor negative emotion?”
e
Future Expectations Period 4: Answer to the question: “What do you think the outcome of your decision in the next period will be?” Answered at
the end of period 4.
f
Economic Outcome Period 4: The actual economic outcome of the project selected in period 4, expressed in Lira.
g
Gender: Coded as 0 for females and 1 for males.
Risk Preferenceb
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TABLE 5.14. Descriptive Statistics for Change in Project Selection Variancea
Panel A: Change in Project Selection Variance by Attained Budget Targetb and Budget
Target Condition: Full Sample
Number of Times the Budget Target was Attained
Three
Four
Five
Total
(s.d.)
(s.d.)
(s.d.)
(s.d.)
[n]
[n]
[n]
[N]
Easy Budget
-441,667.00
1,000
10,357.14
-14,583.35
Target
(N/A)
(74,381.77)
(47,856.53)
(113,375.68)
Conditionc
[1]
[5]
[14]
[20]
Moderate
-75,714.25
68,047.83
25,666.60
18,104.80
Budget Target
(151,428.50)
(285,047.40)
(54,212.52)
(170,486.69)
Condition
[4]
[6]
[10]
[20]
Panel B: Change in Project Selection Variance by Attained Budget Target and Budget
Target Condition: Only Participants who Passed the Manipulation Check
Number of Times the Budget Target was
Attained
Three
Four
Five
Total
(s.d.)
(s.d.)
(s.d.)
(s.d.)
[n]
[n]
[n]
[N]
Easy Budget
-441,667.00
1,000.00
11,153.85
-15,350.89
Target
(N/A)
(74,381.77)
(49,713.93)
(116,429.04)
Conditionc
[1]
[5]
[13]
[19]
Moderate
0.00
-90,656.67
32,708.25
-736.00
Budget Target
(0.00)
(280,528.36)
(59,106.54)
(128,618.20)
Condition
[3]
[3]
[8]
[14]
a

Tests of hypothesis three relate only to those who attained the budget target in every period.
Attained Budget Target: Count variable equal to the number of times an individual has attained the
budget target up to period 5.
c
Change in Project Selection: Difference between the variances in the project selected in period five
versus the project selected in period one
b

The descriptive statistics for the dependent variable change in project selection
variance are presented in Table 5.14. The statistics indicate that there are differences in
project selection variance between the easy and moderate budget target conditions. This
could be partially due to the differences in project selection variance between the budget
target conditions. Therefore, tests of hypothesis three are conducted for the entire
sample, the easy budget target condition, and the moderate budget target condition.
Hypothesis three is tested using only the participants who continually attained their
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budget target. Therefore, only those who attained the budget target five times are
included in the statistical analysis. As can be seen in Table 5.14, the change in project
selection variance for those who attained the budget target in every period is positive,
which is opposite of what hypothesis three predicted. The positive change in project
selection variance appears to not support SP|A theory predictions about risk taking
behavior.
To further analyze the prior assessment, Table 5.15 presents the tests of
hypothesis three. The tests presented are Wilcoxon signed rank tests because the
assumption of normality is violated. The results presented provide no support for
hypothesis three. On the contrary, the results suggest an opposite effect than what was
theorized. Hypothesis three was based on behavioral predictions of SP|A theory.
However, the results suggest that participants behaved in accordance with prospect theory
predictions.
Prospect theory would predict that as individuals reference levels increase, more
projects would be perceived in a loss frame. Increasing reference levels would mean that
more projects place the attainment of the budget target in jeopardy. Therefore, more
projects would be viewed as possible loses because individuals would have a greater
chance of missing the budget target. Thusly, prospect theory predicts that individuals in a
loss frame tend to make more risk-seeking decisions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979;
Chow et al. 2007). The results presented in Table 5.15 tend to support this prediction.
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Statistical tests to support this assertion, however, are not significant using Wilcoxon
signed rank tests.60
The results presented in Table 5.15 do not provide support for hypothesis three.
Specifically, the prediction based on SP|A theory is not supported. To analyze whether
individuals followed the process proposed by SP|A theory, supplemental analysis will
examine which projects participants eliminated in each period prior to making their
project selections.

TABLE 5.15. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests for Hypothesis Three
Panel A: Full Sample of Participants Who Attained Budget Target in Every Period
Standard
Asymptotic
N
Mean
Deviation Z-Score Significancea
All
24
16,736.08 50,039.72
-0.905
0.36
observations
Easy Only
14
10,357.14 47,856.53
0.000
1.00
Moderate Only
10
25,666.60 54,212.52
-1.190
0.23
a
Two-tailed significance level.

5.6 Supplemental Analysis: Project Elimination
During each time period in the experiment participants were asked to eliminate
projects from consideration if they felt they would not consider them when making the
final project selection. This experimental procedure provided insights into the process
through which participants made their risky decisions. Table 5.16 presents the

60

The assertion is supported using parametric two-sample t-tests. The results, however, should be
interpreted with caution. For the entire sample (n=24) [n = 21], p-value = 0.06 [0.05] there is marginal
statistical significance. For the easy budget target condition (n = 14) [n = 13], there is no support for either
SP|A or Prospect Theory. For the moderate budget target condition (n = 10) [n = 8], there is a marginally
significant effect (p = 0.08) [p = 0.08].
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TABLE 5.16. Projects Eliminated from Consideration by Budget Target Condition and Period
Products Eliminated
Budget Target
Period
Conditiona
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
None
2
2
2
4
4
10
17
1
Easy
(10%) (10%) (10%) (20%) (20%) (50%) (85%) (5%)
1
3
1
6
4
12
14
16
2
Moderate
(15%) (5%) (30%) (20%) (60%) (70%) (80%) (10%)
Easy
2
Moderate

Easy
3
Moderate

Easy
4
Moderate

Easy
5
Moderate

5
(25%)
4
(20%)

4
(20%)
3
(15%)

4
(20%)
7
(35%)

5
(25%)
7
(35%)

4
(20%)
10
(50%)

10
(50%)
14
(70%)

16
(80%)
17
(85%)

1
(5%)
0
(0%)

2
(10%)
2
(10%)

4
(20%)
2
(10%)

3
(15%)
7
(35%)

5
(25%)
10
(50%)

5
(25%)
12
(60%)

14
(70%)
14
(70%)

18
(90%)
18
(90%)

1
(5%)
0
(0%)

5
(25%)
3
(15%)

4
(20%)
2
(10%)

4
(20%)
7
(35%)

5
(25%)
7
(35%)

5
(25%)
13
(65%)

14
(70%)
13
(65%)

16
(80%)
17
(85%)

1
(5%)
1
(5%)

3
(15%)
4
(20%)

3
(15%)
4
(20%)

2
(10%)
6
(30%)

6
(30%)
6
(30%)

6
(30%)
12
(60%)

15
(75%)
14
(70%)

16
(80%)
19
(95%)

1
(5%)
0
(0%)

a

There are twenty participants in the easy budget target condition and twenty participants in the moderate budget
target condition.
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descriptive statistics for this data. SP|A predicts that individuals eliminate alternatives
from consideration that place their aspiration level in jeopardy. If SP|A correctly
specifies the process that individuals follow, then I would expect there to be a difference
in which projects participants eliminated between budget target conditions.
In both conditions, projects F and G did not allow for guaranteed attainment of
the budget target, thusly placing the attainment of the aspiration level in jeopardy.
Therefore, I would expect no differences between the two budget target conditions.
Projects C, D, and E, however, are different between the budget target conditions.
Specifically, in the moderate budget target condition projects C, D, and E do not allow
for the guaranteed attainment of the budget target whereas in the easy budget target
condition they do. To examine whether participants project elimination depended upon
their budget target condition, a series of 2 X 2 contingency tables were examined to
assess whether there is a significant difference in which projects were eliminated by
budget condition.
For each 2 X 2 contingency table, budget target was one of the variables. The
other variable was the number of projects eliminated. For example, in period one, project
A would be examined to assess if there was a difference in the probability of dropping
that project by budget target condition. This analysis would continue until period five,
project G. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.17. The a priori
expectations were that the probability of dropping projects C, D, and E would be different
between budget target conditions. The expectation is that participants in the moderate
budget target condition will eliminate these projects more than participants in the easy
budget target condition because these projects place the reference level in jeopardy in the
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moderate budget target condition. Projects C, D, and E are the projects that differ
between budget target conditions in terms of whether or not they guarantee the attainment
of the budget target.61
The results presented in Table 5.17 suggest that participants in the moderate
budget target condition were more likely to eliminate Project E in every period compared
to participants in the easy budget target condition, providing some support for SP|A
predictions. Results for Project C and Project D, however, are not significant and do not
provide support for SP|A predictions. Therefore, the supplemental analysis suggests that
participants do eliminate projects differently based on their reference levels, but the data
do not support all a priori expectations.

61

Analysis with only those participants who passed the manipulation check has slightly different results.
All relationships presented in Table 5.17 remain. Some additional significant differences are found
however. Period one, project C (2 = 3.060, 0.09), period three, project D (2 = 4.758, 0.03), period five,
project C (2 = 3.060, 0.09), and period five, project G (2 = 3.354, 0.09).
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TABLE 5.17. Contingency Tables for Project Eliminationa, b
Variable
Period 1
Period 2
Period 3
c
ProjectA
0.229
0.143
0.000
d
ProjectB
0.360
0.173
0.784
e
ProjectC
2.500
1.129
2.133
ProjectDf
ProjectEg
ProjectFh
ProjectGi
Sample Size

Period 4
0.625
0.784
1.129

Period 5
0.173
0.173
2.500

0.000
6.667**
1.667
0.173

0.476
3.956**
1.667
0.173

2.667*
5.013**
0.000
0.000

0.476
6.465**
0.114
0.173

0.000
3.636*
0.125
2.057

40

40

40

40

40

*, **, *** One-tailed significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
a
The table presents Chi-square statistics. Significance related to Fischer‟s Exact Test. Significance presented is
Fischer Exact Test one-sided.
b
Budget Condition: Coded as a zero for easy budget target condition and a one for moderate budget target
condition.
c
ProjectA: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project A.
d
ProjectB: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project B.
e
ProjectC: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project C.
f
ProjectD: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project D.
g
ProjectE: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project E.
h
ProjectF: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project F.
i
ProjectG: Coded as a zero if participant did not eliminate and a one if they did eliminate Project G.
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6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Summary of Key Findings
Prior research in risky decision making in single-period settings has not provided
a definitive answer relating to how budget targets should be set in order to increase
employee risk-taking behaviors. Chow et al. (2007) find that difficult budget targets lead
to more risk-taking behavior than easy budget targets. Sprinkle et al. (2008), however,
find that easy budget targets lead to more risk-seeking behavior than more difficult
budget targets. This study provides additional evidence in this line of research.
Specifically, the results from this study suggest that individuals make more risk-seeking
decisions under easy budget targets compared to moderate budget targets when analyzing
the initial project selection period.
Prior field studies have suggested that many organizations use moderate to easily
achievable targets in budget-based contracts (Merchant and Manzoni 1989). Although
subsequent field research has failed to provide an in-depth analysis of budget target level,
it is believed that moderate budget targets, rather than difficult budget targets, are used by
many organizations and the use of moderate budget targets is suggested by prior research
(Van der Stede 2000; Fisher et al. 2003). Therefore, organizations utilizing moderate
budget targets should be aware of the evidence provided in this study that moderate
budget targets lead to less risk-taking than easy budget targets.

103

This result is supported by security-potential/aspiration level theory, which
proposes that individuals with easy budget targets have more options that allow the
guaranteed attainment of their reference level (Lopes 1987, 1990; Lopes and Oden 1999).
Once individuals are guaranteed their reference level can be attained, their attention then
focuses on the remaining alternative(s) that gives the highest potential payoff, which will
lead them to select riskier alternatives. Under moderate budget targets, fewer alternatives
guarantee the attainment of the reference level and therefore, many riskier alternatives are
eliminated from consideration, thus leading to less risk-taking behavior.
The aforementioned result suggests firms that want their employees to take more
risks should utilize easy budget targets, compared to moderate budget targets. By doing
so, firms can encourage employees to make more risky decisions. The results also
suggest that firms using moderate budget targets may be stifling employees‟ risk-taking
behavior through the setting of their budget target difficulty. Specifically, the results of
this study suggest that individuals with moderate budget targets make less risky decisions
than those with easy budget targets.
This study also provides empirical evidence that individuals‟ reference levels
change over time. Prior research in decision making generally analyzes single period
settings, in which individuals reference levels are assumed to be fixed and set based on
exogenous factors, such as contract parameters (Wakker 2010). Although this
assumption may be true in single period settings, researchers have acknowledged that
individuals reference levels are not set and tend to change over time (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979, 1992). This study provides evidence consistent with the assertion.
Specifically, the empirical evidence suggests that reference levels do change over time,
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and the magnitude of the change in reference levels is dependent upon the number of
times the budget target was attained. This suggests that the change in reference level is
dependent upon individuals‟ expectations of future economic outcomes because those
who continually attained the budget target received higher levels of economic payments.
Expectations-based reference-dependent preferences theory suggests that
reference levels are at least in part determined based on rational expectations (Koszegi
and Rabin 2006). This study applies this theory and extends it by examining whether
expectations of future economic outcomes play a role in determining individuals‟
reference levels. The results provide evidence that individuals‟ who continually attain
their budget target, and thus would have higher economic expectations, have a greater
increase in the reference level than individuals who miss their budget target at least once.
More specifically, the evidence suggests there is a positive relationship between the
number of times the budget target was attained and the resulting change in reference
level. This finding provides evidence that expectations of future economic outcomes do
play a role in determining individuals‟ reference levels.
Although the findings of this study provide evidence that individuals under easy
budget targets tend to make more risky decisions, the results relating to reference levels
suggest firms should be aware that easy budget targets may lead to greater changes in
employee reference levels. Specifically, when employees begin to expect they will
receive their base pay plus some form of bonus, they are more likely to increase their
reference level. Most decision making theories suggest that individuals‟ reference levels
plays a vital role in decision making. Therefore, theoretically, changes in reference level
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should impact individual decision making, possibly impacting the effectiveness of an
incentive compensation contract.
To counteract changes in reference levels, firms should continually assess their
budget target levels to ensure that employees are not beginning to expect they will
receive a bonus or high levels of variable pay. Budget based contracts are very effective
at focusing employee attention to specific goals embedded in the contract and are
designed to aid in directing employee actions that are desirable for the firm (Milgrom and
Roberts 1992; Fisher et al. 2008). Based on the empirical evidence in this study, firms
should ensure that the goals embedded in their budget based contracts are not too easy,
whereby employees‟ begin to expect the receipt of their bonus, which would result in
greater changes in reference levels. Therefore, firms must weigh the difference between
expected behavior, more risk-seeking, and future expected behaviors, related to changes
in reference levels, to ensure that their budget based contract is having the desired effect
on employee behavior.
Decision-making theories suggest that reference levels play a large role in how
individuals make decisions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Lopes 1987, 1990). Both
security-potential/aspiration level theory and prospect theory emphasize the importance
of the reference level in decision making. The results of this study, however, do not
support this assertion. Specifically, although individuals who attained the budget target
every period exhibited a significant increase in their reference level, there was no
significant difference in their decision making corresponding to the increase in reference
level. Based solely on this result, firms may not have to be as concerned with changes in
reference level as there does not appear to be any significant change in behavior related
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to the change in reference level. This result should be interpreted with caution, however,
as prior empirical work and decision making theories suggest that reference levels play a
vital role in individual decision making.
There could be a number of reasons why individuals‟ decision making did not
change in response to changes in reference level. First, individuals viewed the same
projects every period for five periods. Although the order of the projects was controlled
for, individuals could have become familiar with the projects and therefore continued to
select the same or similar projects, on average. Therefore, no change in project selection
variance could be a result of fixation by participants on particular projects. Second,
although there is a documented change in reference level, the magnitude of the change in
reference level may not have been great enough to warrant significant changes in
decision making. Third, it may take more than a few periods for changes in decision
making to catch up to changes in reference levels. It is possible there is a significant lag
between changes in reference levels and changes in decision making behavior.
Another possibility is related to the statistical analysis of changes in project
selection. The sample size used to test for changes in project selection were relatively
small and more importantly, the standard deviations of the sample tested were three times
larger than the mean of the sample. This indicates there was significant variance in the
data, which could impact the statistical analysis. Therefore, the power of the statistical
test is questionable, as very large standard deviations compared to the mean could lead to
erroneous conclusions. Lastly, the literature relating to reference levels and capturing
individuals‟ reference levels is new and still developing. Therefore, the measure used to
capture reference was a single question. Although I believe this measure captured
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individuals‟ reference levels, it may not have captured them completely. Therefore, there
is the possibility there is a significant amount of noise in the reference level measure,
which could have led to the result that changes in reference level do not impact decision
making.
Supplemental analysis suggests that individuals partially follow securitypotential/aspiration level theory predictions relating to the elimination of alternatives.
Security-potential/aspiration level theory suggests that individuals eliminate alternatives
from consideration that place their aspiration level in jeopardy. The supplemental
analysis shows that individuals making decisions under a moderate budget target were
more likely to eliminate a particular project, Project E, compared to individuals making
decisions under an easy budget target. All a priori expectations, however, were not
found in this analysis. The supplemental analysis and other results from the experiment
suggest that individuals do consider attaining the budget target to be very important.62
However, the elimination of projects does not provide overwhelming support for the
decision making process proposed by security-potential/aspiration level theory.
Overall, this research applied relatively new theories to the accounting literature.
By examining how reference levels are determined, this study opens the door to new
research examining how changing reference levels impact contract design. Applying
expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, this study finds that expectations of
future economic outcomes play a role in determining reference levels. Additionally, this
study extends prior work applying security-potential/aspiration level theory by extending
prior findings and making predictions about longitudinal behavior in a budgeting setting.
62

Participants indicated that the budget target was important to them in the post-experimental questionnaire
( ̅ = 7.93). The question was answered on a 9-point Likert scale.
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The results of the study provide partial support for security-potential/aspiration level
theory predictions.
This research examined how individuals‟ reference levels change over time and
whether changes in reference level impact decision making behavior. The results of the
study provide evidence that individuals reference levels change over time but this change
did not significantly impact individuals‟ decision making. This area of research is ripe
with ideas to investigate how different types of compensation contracts effect
individuals‟ reference levels and how shifting reference levels impact incentive contract
deign and effectiveness.
6.2 Contributions
The major contribution of this study is that I find evidence that reference levels
change over time and that individuals expectations play a vital role in the determination
of reference levels. Individuals develop expectations of future economic outcomes,
based on prior outcomes, and these expectations are used in setting reference levels. This
finding contributes to the literature relating to decision making as well as literature
relating to reference levels. Research in decision making utilizing budget based contracts
is limited, and this study provides additional evidence that individuals making decisions
under easy budget targets tend to make riskier decisions than individuals under moderate
budget targets when risk and economic payments are the only consideration.
Additionally, this study provides evidence that expectations of future economic outcomes
play an important role in setting individual‟s reference level over time.
Another contribution is the application of expectations-based reference-dependent
preferences in the accounting literature. Prior to the introduction of expectations-based
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reference-dependent preferences, there was a lack of theory that specified how
individuals formulated their reference level. Most prior research assumed reference
levels were set based on exogenous factors, such as contract parameters (Wakker 2010).
Prior research in accounting suggests that management accounting practices can be an
important influence on individuals‟ reference levels (Birnberg et al. 2007). For example,
budget targets set by management can be used by employees to set their reference level.
This study links the idea of expectations as a vital aspect in the formulation of reference
levels and financial economic outcomes.
This study also applies security-potential/aspiration level theory. This theory has
seldom been applied in accounting although its implications for accounting are extensive
(Sprinkle et al. 2008). Most prior accounting studies analyzing decision making apply
prospect theory to examine individual behavior. Although prospect theory has been
validated, it does not predict the process of individual decision making, only the decision
that will be made. Security-potential/aspiration level theory explicates not only the
decision that individuals will make but also the process they go through to get to the
decision (Lopes 1990). Therefore, this study attempted to understand not only the
decisions that individuals made but the process they took to reach that decision.
These findings have practical application for firms using budget based contracts.
First, firms that want their employees to take more risk should consider utilizing easy
budget targets, rather than moderate budget targets. Firms use incentive contracts to
direct employee behavior. By using easy budget targets firms would be able to increase
employee risk taking, thus creating goal congruence between the behaviors of their
employees and the goals of the firm.
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Second, firms should be aware that employees‟ reference levels change over time,
which could possibly impact employee behaviors. Although the results of this study do
not support this contention, almost all theories relating to decision making specify that
reference levels impact individual decision making. Based on this theoretical argument,
firms should be cognizant of possible changes in reference levels and continually review
their incentive compensation contracts to ensure employees are exhibiting the desired
behavior. In addition, firms should understand that changes in employee behavior could
be a result of changes in reference levels. Firms design incentive compensation contracts
to direct employee behaviors. It is possible that changes in reference levels can impact
the effectiveness of incentive contracts.
6.3 Limitations
This study‟s findings and conclusions should be considered in light of its
limitations. First, the projects presented to participants were the same in every period to
allow for comparisons between periods. Therefore, participants could have become
familiar with the projects that were presented. The order of project presentation,
however, was varied in order to decrease this possibility and an ordering variable was not
statistically significant in any hypotheses tests.
Second, student proxies were used as managers. However, this limitation may not
have a large impact on the results. Although prior research suggests using student
proxies may results in a different magnitude of results, the interpretation of the results is
generally the same (Trottier and Gordon 2011). In addition, prior research suggests that
students are likely to be better surrogates for managers involving decision-making tasks
(Ashton and Kramer 1980; Houghton and Hronsky 1993). Lastly, experience in selecting
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projects is consistent with individuals selecting from a series of lotteries. Therefore,
experience in selecting lotteries is not expected to interact with any variables of interest
(Peecher and Solomon 2001).
Another limitation is how reference levels were measured. Prior research
investigating reference levels is limited. The question used to assess reference levels was
derived from prior research examining reference levels in stock valuation decisions
(Arkes et al. 2010). Using only one measure to assess reference levels, however, has its
drawbacks. Ideally a number of questions would have been asked and a factor score of
reference level would have been created. However, validated questions of reference
levels are scarce and subsequently only one question was used in this study. Therefore,
more research is needed to develop more comprehensive measures of reference levels and
future expectations.
The last limitation to note is the measurement of future expectations. This
measure was assessed using a single question. Again, this could explain why there were
no significant results relating to future expectations as a measure. Also, it is possible that
the wording of the question led to confusion among the participants as many participants
answered with the same amount for reference level and future expectations. This
limitation, however, presents an opportunity for future research, as discussed in the next
section.
6.4 Future Research
The results of this study may provide some future research opportunities. More
research is warranted to identify the behavioral impact of budget target difficulty on risk
taking behavior. The results of this study and prior research supports the security-
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potential/aspiration level theory predictions that easy budget target goals lead to more
risk taking behavior than moderate budget target goals (Sprinkle et al. 2008). Research
also supports prospect theory predictions that difficult budget targets lead to more risk
taking than easy budget target goals (Chow et al. 2007). Research attempting to identify
boundary conditions for budget target difficulty and its positive impact on risk taking is
warranted, especially considering the number of companies that use budget targets in
compensation contracts (Murphy 2001; Sprinkle and Williamson 2004; Fisher et al.
2008).
Future research could also investigate the link between reference levels and
decision making. The results of this study do not provide a definite link between
reference levels and decision making that is proposed by numerous decision making
theories. Specifically, both prospect theory and security-potential/aspiration level theory
propose that individual make decisions based upon their reference level. More research
investigating this link is warranted.
Future research could also examine the process through which individuals‟
reference levels change. Specifically, research could investigate whether expectationsbased reference-dependent preferences is a descriptive theory of the process through
which reference levels change. This study does not have enough data to conduct this
analysis but research addressing this issue would be critical to furthering our knowledge
about reference levels and their impact on behavior.
An additional avenue for future research would be further examination of how
reference levels change. This study provided evidence that expectations of future
economic outcomes impact individuals‟ reference levels. Future studies should examine
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whether this is also true in compensation contracts where an explicit reference level is not
as apparent as they are in budget-based contracts.
Lastly, future research should also begin to develop more measures of reference
levels and future expectations. In this study, reference levels and future expectations
were assessed with a single question. More specifically, reference levels were assessed
with a one-dimensional measure designed to capture individuals‟ indifference point.
Reference levels, however, are complex in nature and future research could begin to
assess multi-dimensional measures. Multi-dimensional measures could be more
representative of reference levels as a whole compared to measures that only assess
individuals‟ indifference points. Overall, there is much that is not known about
reference levels and future research could begin to investigate reference levels more.
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APPENDIX A – EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Experiment Procedures
1. Introduction

a. General Instructions/Informed Consent
b. Informed will be paid for participation

2. Letter Decoding

a. Instructions
b. Perform a one minute training session and receive feedback
c. Informed of performance requirement to decode fifty-five
letters to numbers in the main letter decoding session
d. Complete three minute main letter decoding session
e. Feedback on performance in main session and whether the
performance requirement was satisfied

3. Risk Preference
and Loss
Aversion Tasks

a. Informed of compensation for risk preference and loss
aversion tasks
b. Example of task selection
c. Compensation question
d. Risk preference task (Holt and Laury 2002)
e. Loss aversion task (Brink and Rankin 2011)

4. Main
Experiment
Instructions

a. Assume role of product manager
b. Two product selections will be randomly chosen and
experiment compensation will be based on these selections
c. Conversion rate of experimental currency

5. Background for
main
experiment

a. Background of ABC Company, compensation contract,
manipulation of budget target, and reminder of conversion
rate

6. Product
Examples

a. Two examples of product selection with detailed description
of information presented
b. Two additional examples with three understanding
questions for each example

7. Main
Experiment

a. Reminder of role, contract, and budget target level
b. Baseline reference level question and compensation
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c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

question
Period 1 product elimination phase
Period 1 product selection
Feedback on period 1
Reference level and future expectations questions
Repeat for periods 2 – 5
Post experiment questionnaire
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APPENDIX B – EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
Instructions:
Thank you for your participation in this research study. The purpose of this study is to
obtain information about decision makers. You will be asked to assume the role of a
product manager throughout the entire study. You will be asked to perform multiple
tasks and to provide your perceptions based on information provided during the task. The
information provided in the set of materials is intended to be representative rather than
complete. Please be sure to base your opinions and perceptions only on the information
provided in this case. There are no right or wrong answers. Please carefully read all
information provided before responding to the questions.
For your participation you will receive 5 course credit points from your professor. If you
choose not to participate in this experiment, you may complete a written assignment for
the 5 points. You will also have the opportunity to earn monetary compensation for your
participation in this experiment based on the choices you make as a product manager.
Your responses are confidential. No identifying information will be used.
Your participation in this study should take approximately one hour. Your participation is
voluntary and your responses will be kept confidential.
The person in charge of this research study is Lee Kersting, and he is called the Principal
Investigator. However, other research staff may be involved and can act on behalf of the
person in charge. This research is considered minimal risk. The risks from participating
in this study are not more than would be encountered in everyday life. Your participation
in this study will help advance the body of knowledge regarding the business profession.
You may choose not to participate in this study. Refusal to take part in this study will
involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled. Your
decision to participate or not participate, or a decision to withdraw from the study after
having agreed to participate, will not affect your student status. You may discontinue
participation in this study at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you
may otherwise be entitled.
This study, titled “Individual Decision Making,” is an approved IRB study. If you have
any questions or concerns about this study, please contact Lee Kersting at 813-974-7340.
If you have questions about your rights as a participant in this study, general questions, or
complaints, concerns or issues you want to discuss with someone outside the research
study, call the Division of Research Integrity and Compliance at the University of South
Florida at 813-974-5638.
By proceeding to the next page, you are agreeing to participate in this study.
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Letter Decoding Instructions

Your first task involves decoding letters to numbers. Shown below is a screen shot of the
application you will be using:
Decoding Task Screen

As you can see, the screen is split into two frames. In the top frame, you will see a
“decoding key,” which indicates the correspondence between letters and numbers. The
input window is in the bottom frame, where you see the time remaining and one input
box. Your task is to enter the letter that corresponds to the number in the input box
and press ‘Enter’ to submit.
In the above example, the number 29 corresponds to the letter k by referencing the
decoding key. So you would put k in the text box. You would then press „Enter,‟ which
will result in submitting your input. You will immediately know whether you were
correct or wrong. Once you hit „Enter‟ a new number will appear and you will decode
the new number in the same fashion.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. If you have no questions, click on the
link below to proceed (do not attempt to “use” the screen shown above - - it is just a
screen shot!). You will be taken to a screen where you will perform the decoding task, as
explained above.

Click Here to Proceed
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Will perform a one-minute letter-decoding task as a training session

DECODING TASK TRAINING DONE

You are done with the training session to become familiar with the decoding task.
Your performance is summarized below:
Number correctly decoded:

7

Number incorrectly decoded:

0

If you do not understand any aspect of the decoding task, please raise your hand.
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Now that you have completed the training session and are familiar with the letter
decoding task you will complete one more session.
For completing this portion of the experiment you will earn $2. In order to continue in the
experiment, you must decode 55 letters over the next three-minute letter decoding
session. You will have the opportunity to earn significantly more money in the later
segments of the experiment.
If you fail to decode 55 letters in the next session you will be asked to leave the
experiment and receive $2.
Click Here to Proceed to First Session
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Main letter decoding session that lasts for three minutes

DECODING TASK SESSION ONE DONE

You are done with session one of the decoding task.
Your performance is summarized below:
Number correctly decoded session one:

77

Number incorrectly decoded session one:

4

Passed Performance Threshold:

Click here to proceed
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YES

Instructions
Now that you have completed the letter decoding task and successfully passed the
requirement to remain in the experiment you will be asked to answer a number of
questions.
In the following pages you will be presented with two tasks. These tasks will present
options like the example presented below. For each task there will be ten sets of options
presented. You will be required to select one of the two options in each row. One of the
ten sets of options from each task will be selected for compensation, which means the
outcome of your selection will be simulated and you will earn the outcome in $US
Dollars.

Example

or
0/10 of $3.00 + 10/10 of $2.00

0/10 of $6.00 + 10/10 of $.15

The example above presents two options.
The option on the left has a 0% chance of you winning $3 and a 100% chance of winning
$2.
The option on the right has a 0% chance of winning $6 and a 100% chance of winning
$0.15.
If you selected the option on the left, then you would possibly receive $2 for this
selection.
The next two pages contain a number of options similar to the example presented above.
For each row select the option you prefer.
For each of the two tasks on the following pages, one ROW from each task will be
selected and you will be compensated based on the outcome of your selection.
Therefore, if the above example were the row selected for actual compensation you
would earn $2, which you WILL receive at the end of the experiment.
When you are ready to begin click on the Next button below.

Next
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Each task you are about to complete contains ten sets of options. For an individual task
(ten sets of options), how many rows will be randomly selected for compensation?

1
2
3
5
7
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Risk preferences task (Holt and Laury 2002)
For EACH of the following ten choices (One choice per ROW), please indicate which of the two
options you would prefer by selecting your preference.
OPTION A
OPTION B

Example

0/10 of $3.00 + 10/10 of $2.00

or

0/10 of $4.00 + 10/10 of $.15

You should make TEN choices, one for each pair of options.
1

0/10 of $4.00 + 10/10 of $3.20

or

0/10 of $7.70 + 10/10 of $.20

2

1/10 of $4.00 + 9/10 of $3.20

or

1/10 of $7.70 + 9/10 of $.20

3

2/10 of $4.00 + 8/10 of $3.20

or

2/10 of $7.70 + 8/10 of $.20

4

3/10 of $4.00 + 7/10 of $3.20

or

3/10 of $7.70 + 7/10 of $.20

5

4/10 of $4.00 + 6/10 of $3.20

or

4/10 of $7.70+ 6/10 of $.20

6

5/10 of $4.00 + 5/10 of $3.20

or

5/10 of $7.70 + 5/10 of $.20

7

6/10 of $4.00 4/10 of $3.20

or

6/10 of $7.70 + 4/10 of $.20

8

7/10 of $4.00 + 3/10 of $3.20

or

7/10 of $7.70 + 3/10 of $.20

9

8/10 of $4.00 + 2/10 of $3.20

or

8/10 of $7.70 + 2/10 of $.20

10

9/10 of $4.00 + 1/10 of $3.20

or

9/10 of $7.70 + 1/10 of $.20
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Loss aversion task (Brink and Rankin 2011)
For EACH of the following ten choices (One choice per ROW), please indicate which of
the two options you would prefer by selecting your preference.
The numbers presented in parentheses represent negative numbers. Therefore, if you
selected the option on the left in the example below, you would have a 50% change of
winning $5.00 and a 50% chance of losing $1.50.
OPTION A

Example

OPTION B

50% of $5.00 + 50% of ($1.50)

or

50% of $1.00 + 50% ($1.00)

You should make TEN choices, one for each pair of options.
1

50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($1.87)

or

50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33)

2

50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($2.00)

or

50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33)

3

50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($2.13)

or

50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33)

4

50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($2.33)

or

50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33)

5

50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($2.53)

or

50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33)

6

50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($2.80)

or

50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33)

7

50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($3.20)

or

50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33)

8

50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($3.87)

or

50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33)

9

50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($5.27)

or

50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33)

10

50% of $6.67 + 50% of ($9.33)

or

50% of $1.33 + 50% ($1.33)
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Main experiment instruction page
You will now be asked to read information relating to a Company and assume the role of
a product manager for this company. You will be asked to make a number of decisions in
this role of product manager.
You will be compensated based on the decisions you make and the resulting outcomes.
Of all the decisions you make relating to ABC Company and the products they produce,
two of your production decisions will be selected at random. You will be compensated
based on these two randomly selected decisions in the following segment of the
experiment.
All answer you provide related to compensation should be presented in terms of Lira.
All monetary terms are described in terms of Lira, which is an experimental currency.
The Lira you earn in the two randomly selected sessions is converted into U.S. dollars at
a rate of 20,000 Lira to $1. Therefore, if you earn $100,000 Lira in a session this is
equivalent to $5 which you will receive at the conclusion of the experiment.
When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next
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Narrative describing ABC Company - Easy Budget Target (Moderate Budget
Target)
Background
ABC Company produces and manufactures a wide variety of products. As a
product manager, you are tasked with selecting which product ABC Company should
manufacture for the year. Following on historical analysis, ABC Company determined
that each product selected will be manufactured and sold for one year.
The task of selecting products to manufacture and market is delegated to a
number of product managers. Each product manager oversees his/her own staff of
product developers, whose job is to design or seek out potential new products. At the
beginning of each year, the product development staff for each product manager will
propose to their product manager seven products. The proposal for each product will
include the staff's estimate relating to the probability of achieving the budget, the amount
paid if the budget is not met, and the highest and lowest amounts paid if the budget is
met. Historically, the product development staff provides highly accurate estimates.
At the beginning of each year, each product manager is allocated funds to invest
in one of the seven products. He/she then uses this allocated amount to manufacture and
market one product out of the seven that his/her staff proposes. All products presented
cost the same amount to manufacture and market.
ABC Company pays their product managers a base salary plus a bonus for
product returns above a budget threshold. ABC Company has determined that you will be
paid an annual base salary of 15,000 Lira (30,000 Lira) and you will be presented with a
number of products to choose from. Due to the level of the budget threshold that has been
set, a majority of the products presented will allow (will not allow) you to attain the
budget threshold with certainty.
The experimental currency, Lira, is convertible to U.S. Dollars at a rate of 20,000
Lira to $1.

When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next
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Product selection examples with detailed description – Moderate Budget Target
Example of Product Selection
Presented on the next two pages are two example products that a product manager could
select from. The information is compiled by the product development staff and is
presented in summary format. The format and presentation style will be the same in
future exposures to product selection decisions. Recall that the monetary values presented
are Lira, a form of experimental currency.
Product X
Probability of Meeting the Budget
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met
Lowest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met
Highest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met

65%
30,000
170,000
252,308

For Product X, the probability of not meeting the budget is 35%.
As can be seen for Product X, there is a 65% chance that this project will allow the
product manager to meet his/her budget threshold. Therefore, there is a 35% chance that
this product will not allow the manager to achieve his/her budget threshold. If the budget
threshold is not met then the manager will receive his/her base salary.
For Product X, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is 30000.
If the budget threshold is not met then a manager receives only his/her annual base salary.
In this case, if the budget threshold is not met, then the manager will receive 30000 Lira.
For Product X, the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met is 211,154.
If the budget threshold is met, then the product manager will receive some amount of
payment ranging from 170,000 Lira (lowest amount paid if budget is met) to 252,308
Lira (highest amount paid if the budget is met) with each amount between the lowest and
highest payoff being equally likely. Therefore, if the budget threshold is met, a product
manager has equal probability of earning all amounts ranging from 170,000 Lira to
252,308 Lira.
Thus, the average payment for meeting the budget threshold would be 211,154 Lira
((170,000 + 252,308) / 2).
Additionally, the product manager's base salary is included in the lowest and highest
amounts paid if the budget is met.
When you are ready to proceed, hit Next
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Product Y
Probability of Meeting the Budget
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met
Lowest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met
Highest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met

100%
N/A
125,000
205,000

For Product Y, the probability of not meeting the budget is 0%.
As can be seen for Product Y, there is a 100% chance that this project will allow the
product manager to meet his/her budget threshold. Therefore, there is a 0% chance that
this product will not allow the manager to achieve his/her budget threshold. If the budget
threshold is not met then the manager will receive his/her base salary.
For Product Y, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is N/A.
If the budget threshold is not met then a manager receives only his/her annual base salary.
In this case, because there is a 0% chance that this product will cause a manager to miss
their budget threshold, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is not available
because this will not happen.
For Product Y, the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met is 165000.
Because the budget threshold will be met, the product manager will receive some amount
of payment ranging from 125,000 Lira (lowest amount paid if budget is met) to 205,000
Lira (highest amount paid if budget is met) with each amount between the lowest and
highest payoff being equally likely. Therefore, because the budget target will be met, a
product manager has equal probability of earning all amounts ranging from 125,000 Lira
to 205,000 Lira.
Thus, the average payment for meeting the budget threshold would be 165,000 Lira
((125,000 + 205,000) / 2).
Additionally, the product manager's base salary is included in the lowest and highest
amounts paid if the budget is met.
When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next
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Product examples and understanding questions – Moderate Budget Target

In your answers percentages (%) and commas for Lira are not necessary and
may interfere with you correctly answering the questions. Please just enter a
number amount (ex, 25 or 100000) or N/A where applicable.
Example of Project Selection
Product A
Probability of Meeting the Budget
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met
Lowest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met
Highest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met

70%
30,000
180,000
237,144

For Product A, the probability of not meeting the budget is

%

For Product A, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is

Lira

For Product A, what is the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met?
Lira

Product B
Probability of Meeting the Budget
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met
Lowest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met
Highest Amount Paid if Budget Is Met

100%
N/A
145,000
185,000

For Product B, the probability of not meeting the budget is

%

For Product B, the amount paid if the budget threshold is not met is

Lira

For Product B, what is the average expected payoff if the budget threshold is met?
Lira
When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next
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Reminder of instructions, manipulation, and compensation

Business Simulation
Please assume the role of a product manager of the ABC Company. For this simulation
you will be asked to make decisions in this role. The decisions you make will impact the
amount of compensation you receive. Recall that two randomly selected decisions will
be chosen that will be the basis of your experimental compensation.
All of the preceding information, including product manager's responsibilities, the
company's situation and desires, and how product managers are evaluated and paid, will
apply.
The company has allocated funds to you, the product manager, to manufacture and
market a product in this period.
ABC Company has determined that you will be paid an annual base salary of 30,000 Lira
and you will be presented with a number of products to choose from. Due to the level of
the budget threshold that has been set, a majority of the products presented will not allow
you to attain the budget threshold with certainty.
Your product development staff has proposed seven new products for this period. The
information for each product is presented on the next page.
When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next

When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next
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Baseline reference level question and Experiment Compensation Question

Before beginning the main experiment please answer the following question:

At what level of payment would you have neither positive nor negative emotion?
in Lira
Of all the product selection decisions you will make, how many will be randomly
selected and used as a basis for your experimental compensation?
1
2
3
5
10

When you are ready to begin the next portion of the experiment, click Next
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Product Selection Task - Period 1
Please indicate which products you would NOT consider selecting by clicking on the box
above the products presented.
On the next page you will actually select which product you want to manufacture and
market.
On this page you are selecting which products you would not consider selecting.
By clicking on the box above a product you are indicating you WOULD NOT consider
selecting that product.

A
Probability of Meeting the
Budget
Amount Paid if Budget is
Not Met
Lowest Amount Paid if
Budget Is Met
Highest Amount Paid if
Budget Is Met

75%

B
100%

30,000 N/A

C

D

55%

65%

E
100%

30,000 30,000 N/A

F

G

70%

60%

30,000 30,000

167,500 182,500 40,000 80,000 180,000 95,000 65,000
305,833 187,500 583,636 456,923 190,000 407,857 511,667

When you are finished selecting which products you would not consider in your selection
process hit Next,
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Product Selection Task - Period 1
Please select one of the following products to manufacture and market in the current year:
A
Probability of Meeting the
Budget
Amount Paid if Budget is
Not Met
Lowest Amount Paid if
Budget Is Met
Highest Amount Paid if
Budget Is Met

75%

B
100%

30,000 N/A

C

D

55%

65%

E
100%

30,000 30,000 N/A

F

G

70%

60%

30,000 30,000

167,500 182,500 40,000 80,000 180,000 95,000 65,000
305,833 187,500 583,636 456,923 190,000 407,857 511,667

Indicate which product you would like to manufacture and market:

When you are satisfied with your decision, click Next
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Outcome and compensation related information for period 1

Outcome and compensation related information for period 1
Attained budget target Yes
Period 1
222161
Click next when you are ready to proceed to the next page.
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Reference level and future expectations questions (t = 1)

Questions:
At what level of payment would you have neither positive nor negative emotion?
in Lira
What do you think the outcome of your decision in the next period will be?
in Lira
How confident are you that this outcome will occur?

5%

When you have completed the questions above, click Next
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Periods 2 – 5 will proceed in the same fashion. The order of presentation of the
products will be controlled for.
Below is an example of the outcome feedback that will be presented in period 3.
Outcome and compensation related information for period 3
Attained budget target Yes
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
222161 184513 350741
Click next when you are ready to proceed to the next page.
Below is an example of the product selection task in Period 4
Product Selection Task - Period 4
Your compensation from period 3 was 350741
Your compensation from period 2 was 184513
Your compensation from period 1 was 222161
Please select one of the following products to manufacture and market in the current year:

Probability of Meeting the Budget
Amount Paid if Budget is Not Met
Lowest Amount Paid if Budget Is
Met
Highest Amount Paid if Budget Is
Met

B
C
D
70%
55%
100%
30,000 30,000 N/A

E
F
75%
100%
30,000 N/A

G
65%
30,000

95,000 40,000 180,000 167,500 182,500 80,000
407,857 583,636 190,000 305,833 187,500 456,923

Indicate which product you would like to manufacture and market:
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After the fifth period ended and participants answered the final reference point and future
expectation question, they were shown the following screen:
The main experimental task is complete. You have completed five periods, of which two
will be
randomly selected for compensation. You will be informed of the rounds selected and
your total compensation for your participation at the conclusion of the experiment.

When you are ready to continue click Next
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Post experimental questionnaire

Of the seven products presented, how many guaranteed the budget target would
be attained?
Most

Few

Submit Answ er

148

Demographic Questions
Gender

M

F

Age
Years of full time equivalent work experience

149

years.

1) The level of my budget threshold allowed me to easily attain my budget threshold.
Not at all
1

Moderately
2

3

4

5

Completely
6

7

8

9

2) My evaluation of products depended on the level of my budget threshold.
Not at all
1

Moderately
2

3

4

5

Completely
6

7

8

9

3) Meeting the budget threshold was important to me.
Not at all
1

Moderately
2

3

4

5

Completely
6

7

8

9

4) To what extent did the level of the budget threshold affect your product selection?
Not at all
1

Moderately
2

3

4

5

Completely
6

7

8

9

5) I felt that meeting the budget threshold was difficult.
Not at all
1

Moderately
2

3

4

5

Completely
6

7

8
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6) I took the experiment seriously.
Not at all
1

Moderately
2

3

4

5

Completely
6

7

8

9

7) It was easy to understand the experimental instructions.
Not at all
1

Moderately
2

3

4

5

Completely
6

7

8

9

8) There were too many products to select from.
Not at all
1

Moderately
2

3

4

5

Completely
6

7

8

9

9) I felt the task was a good representation of the real world.
Not at all
1

Moderately
2

3

4

5

Completely
6

7

8
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Compensation Page

A summary of your earned compensation is displayed below:
Phase of Experiment

Lira Earned U.S. Dollars Earned

Letter Decoding

N/A

$2

Risk Preferences

N/A

$4.00

Loss Aversion

N/A

$6.67

Main Experiment Period 5 468144

$23.41

Main Experiment Period 2 184513

$9.23

Total Compensation

$45.31

Thank you for participating in this experiment.
Please print this page and bring it to the experimenter to receive your experimental
compensation
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June 19, 2012
Lee Kersting
School of Accountancy
4202 E. Fowler Ave., BSN 3413
Tampa, FL 33620
RE: Exempt Certification for IRB#: Pro00007985
Title: The Longitudinal Effectiveness of Incentive Contracts: The Impact of Reference
Levels
Dear Mr. Kersting:
On 6/16/2012 the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets USF
requirements and Federal Exemption criteria as outlined in the federal regulations at
45CFR46.101(b):
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude,
achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior,
unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be
identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the
human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of
criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing,
employability, or reputation.
As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research
is conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined
in the Belmont Report and with USF IRB policies and procedures. Please note that changes to
this protocol may disqualify it from exempt status. Please note that you are responsible for
notifying the IRB prior to implementing any changes to the currently approved protocol.
The Institutional Review Board will maintain your exemption application for a period of five
years from the date of this letter or for three years after a Final Progress Report is received,
whichever is longer. If you wish to continue this protocol beyond five years, you will need to
submit a continuing review application at least 60 days prior to the exemption expiration date.
Should you complete this study prior to the end of the five-year period, you must submit a
request to close the study.
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the
University of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.
Sincerely,

John A. Schinka, Ph.D., Chairperson
USF Institutional Review Board
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